Brooklyn Law School

BrooklynWorks
Faculty Scholarship

Winter 2003

The Diminishing Equivalence between Regulatory
Takings and Physical Takings
Andrew S. Gold
Brooklyn Law School, andrew.gold@brooklaw.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
Recommended Citation
107 Dick. L. Rev. 571 (2002-2003)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.

The Diminishing Equivalence Between
Regulatory Takings and Physical Takings
Andrew S. Gold*
I.

Introduction

Regulatory takings doctrine has been inconsistent and confused for
some time now, drawing fire from a broad range of critics.' For decades
the Supreme Court has applied an "ad hoc" balancing test to determine
when a regulation's effect on property triggers the just compensation
requirement of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.2 The recent
decision in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency,3 however, is a major development in takings law.
Tahoe-Sierra held that a three-year moratorium on all development of
land was not a per se taking of property. 4 The Tahoe-Sierra reasoning
indicates that the Court is rejecting the proposal in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastal Council5 that regulatory takings are compensable based
on a sufficient "practical equivalence" to physical takings of property.
This reluctance to equate regulatory and physical governmental acts
* Associate, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP, Wilmington, DE. J.D.,
Duke University; B.A., Dartmouth College. The author would like to thank Elizabeth
Rhea for her helpful advice and comments. The views expressed in this article are
entirely the author's own and do not represent the views of Skadden, Arps.
1. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A
Reappraisal,51 ALA. L. REv. 977, 979 (2000) ("[O]utsiders have pronounced the Court's
property jurisprudence incoherent, and some of the Justices have been kinder only in
form."); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1711 (1988) ("[A] comprehensive answer [to the takings question]
is sorely needed."); Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still
a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 562 (1984) ("[Clourts continue to reach ad hoc
determinations rather than principled resolutions."); John A. Humbach, A Unifying
Theory for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regulation and Public Use, 34
RUTGERS L. REv. 243, 244 (1982) (describing takings as "a farrago of fumblings which
have suffered too long from a surfeit of deficient theories").
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use
without just compensation.").
3. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
4. Id.
5. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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ensures continued uncertainty in takings jurisprudence.
Current regulatory takings jurisprudence originated in an opinion
penned by Justice Holmes in the early twentieth century. 6 In
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,7 Justice Holmes noted that a use of the
police power could diminish "to some extent the values incident to
property" without the government having to compensate the owner
because, otherwise, "[g]overnment could hardly go on." 8 However, he
also noted that there are constitutional limits to the police power. "One
fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
sustain the act." 9 Justice Holmes famously concluded: "[W]hile
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."' 0
The Supreme Court has since struggled, with varying degrees of
success, to define when a regulation "goes too far." In Penn Central
TransportationCo. v. City of New York," the Court set forth the ad hoc
balancing test, which it now applies to most regulatory takings cases.
Under the "fairness and justice" balancing test of Penn Central, courts
look at the unique facts of each case, paying special attention to three
factors: the economic impact of the regulation, the property owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the
government action.' 2 In propounding this test, the Court conceded its
6. See Tahoe, 122 S. Ct. at 1480 (describing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), as the case "that gave birth to our regulatory takings jurisprudence").
But see Kris W. Kobach, The Originsof Regulatory Takings: Setting the Record Straight,
1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1267-72 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court's regulatory
takings jurisprudence began in the nineteenth century, with the Court's decision in Yates
v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497 (1870)). There are numerous early state court
decisions recognizing the appropriateness of just compensation for regulations that
effectively deprive owners of their property. See, e.g., Gardner v. Trustees of the Vill. of
Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816). Further, there is an interpretation of
Pennsylvania Coal as a due process decision. See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, "The
Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings' Jurisprudence": The Myth and Meaning of
JusticeHolmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996).
7. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
8. Id. at 413.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 415.
11. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. See id. at 124 ("In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance. The
economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course,
relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action.") (citation
omitted). The Court's inquiry owes much to the analysis of regulatory takings principles
set forth in Frank I. Michelman, Property,Utility and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical
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difficulty in refining the definition of a regulatory taking: "[T]his Court,
quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for
determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government,
rather than
13
persons.,
few
a
on
concentrated
disproportionately
remain
The Lucas decision presents a notable exception to the Penn Central
test when government regulations have a severe enough impact on the
use of property, amounting to a permanent physical occupation of land.
The Court has long recognized that permanent physical occupations of
land mandate compensation.14 In Lucas, a state law prevented an owner
of a beachfront property from developing his land, and a state court held
that the regulation destroyed all value in the property. 5 The Lucas Court
rejected a Penn Central analysis in this context, noting the similarity of
the regulation's effect to a permanent physical occupation of land.1 6 The
Court concluded that a regulation that destroys all economically
beneficial use of property is a categorical taking.' 7 This holding is
known as the Lucas "per se" rule.
The Lucas Court also concluded that certain types of regulation

Foundationsof "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).

13. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. It is a subject of debate whether the Court has
felt unease with its inability to find a test more precise than the ad hoc Penn Central test,
or whether the Court to the contrary has celebrated this uncertainty. Compare RoseAckerman, supra note 1, at 1699 ("[T]he Court seems to be inordinately proud of the ad
hoc nature of its takings opinions."), with Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM.
L. REV. 1600, 1621-22 (1988) ("[T]he Court could perhaps be heard confessing a sense
of unease about the lack of definition and rigor in its regulatory-takings doctrine."):
Regardless, the Court has evinced uncertainty over when a regulatory taking occurs in
several post-Penn Central decisions. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987) ("[T]his Court has generally 'been unable to
develop any set formula for determining when justice and fairness require that economic
injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons."') (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)); Id. at 508 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Admittedly,
questions arising under the Just Compensation Clause rest on ad hoc factual inquiries,
and must be decided on the facts and circumstances in each case."); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) ("There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention
under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been
developed in a variety of settings. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as
much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic.").
14. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(announcing per se compensation rule for permanent physical invasions of real property).
15. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020 (1992).
16. See id. at 1017 ("We have never set forth the justification for this rule. Perhaps
it is simply, as Justice Brennan suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from
the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.").
17. See id. at 1015 ("The second situation in which we have found categorical
treatment appropriate is where regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive
use of land.").
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inherently do not merit compensation, so long as background principles
of state law indicate that the property rights at issue never belonged to
the property owner in the first place.' 8 Regulations that prevent uses of
property that constitute a nuisance are a typical example of a
noncompensable act of this type.' 9 This limitation through background
principles of state law is a narrow exception to the Lucas per se rule and,
once again, the Court's reasoning was supported by a comparison to
physical takings law.2 °
Although the outcome in Lucas was foreshadowed by prior
decisions,2 1 the Court's holding represented a significant step in
clarifying when regulatory takings do and do not occur. The Supreme
Court recognized in Lucas that, from the landowner's perspective, a
regulation of property can be the equivalent of a permanent physical
taking.
This article will refer to this theory of compensation as the
"practical equivalence" doctrine. After Lucas, it remained to be seen
whether the practical equivalence doctrine would apply in other contexts,
such as the temporary destruction of all economically beneficial uses of
land.2 3
Prior to Tahoe-Sierra,temporary regulation appeared to be a natural
context for an extension of the Lucas practical equivalence doctrine. The
Supreme Court's decision in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles,24 a predecessor to Lucas, recognized that
temporary regulations may require just compensation, but it did not
answer the question of when such compensation would be due. In that
case, the California Court of Appeal barred a taking claim based on the
18.

See id. at 1027 ("Where the State seeks to sustain a regulation that deprives land

of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the

logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the
proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.").

19. See id. at 1029-30 (referring to principles of state nuisance law as an example of
relevant background principles of state law).
20. See id. at 1028 (noting that weight of public interests is not relevant to a
compensation determination in the physical taking context).
21.

See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (recognizing

compensation requirement where a regulation "denies an owner economically viable use
of his land").
22. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-19.
23. An additional ramification of the Lucas decision, suggested by the Federal

Circuit, is the possibility that the Lucas decision effectively revised the three-part
balancing test of Penn Central. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d
1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating that, after Lucas, the third factor under Penn
Central-thenature of the government act-would address the question whether the state
had the power to regulate under background principles of state law such as common law
nuisance doctrine). For a helpful discussion of this theory, see James L. Huffman, Judge
Plager's "Sea Change" in Regulatory Takings Law, 6 FoRDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 597, 613-14
(1995).
24. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
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regulatory destruction of all use of land, in light of the California
Supreme Court's prior holding that the only remedy for what it referred
to as "excessive regulation" was invalidation of the law rather than just
compensation.25
The United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded for further proceedings.2 6
Under the California Court of Appeal's understanding, where a
regulation was held to violate the Takings Clause, the property owner
would receive no compensation for the time during which the regulation
had been in effect.27 The United States Supreme Court, however, had
previously recognized that the condemnation of leasehold interests
requires compensation,28 and it accordingly held in FirstEnglish that, if a
temporary regulatory taking had occurred, just compensation would be
due. 29 Notably, the First English Court stated: "'[T]emporary' takings
which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different
in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly
'30
"
compensation.
requires
Although the First English Court exempted normal delays during
the zoning process from its holding,31 the Court's language regarding
destruction of use paralleled the per se rule in Lucas. First English did
not determine if there was a taking on its facts, but one could infer from
the opinion that the temporary destruction of all economically beneficial
use of property triggers the Takings Clause. The Tahoe-Sierra Court
held otherwise.32
The opinion in Tahoe-Sierra restricts the further development of
takings doctrine in a categorical direction, returning to the Penn Central
model. In Tahoe-Sierra,the Court addressed a three-year moratorium on
development which destroyed all economically beneficial use of the
regulated land during its operation. The Tahoe Sierra Court determined
that Lucas did not apply on these facts, and rejected the extension of a

25. Id. at 308-09 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff'd on
othergrounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)).
26. Id.at 322.
27. Seeid. at312.
28. Id.at 318-19 (citing Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949);
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945)).
29. Id.
30. Id.at 318.
31. See id. at 321 ("We limit our holding to the facts presented, and of course do not
deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which
are not before us.").
32. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct.
1465 (2002).
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Lucas-type rule to temporary regulatory takings. 33 In de-emphasizing the
link between regulations and their physical effect, the Court instead
viewed the case through the lens of "fairness and justice,' '34 an analysis
that in this case was largely concerned with the costs to regulators that
might result from a per se rule.35
Borrowing language from Justice O'Connor's recent one-Justice
concurrence in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,3 6 the Tahoe-Sierra Court
concluded that the "temptation to adopt what amount to per se rules in
either direction must be resisted., 37 The decision of six Justices that such
temptations ought to be resisted is more than symbolic, as the only way
to resist such per se rules with any coherence is to reject their rationale.
In support of its decision, the Court concluded that the concepts
underlying regulatory takings are indeterminate. 38 Tahoe-Sierra, as a
result, is one of the Court's strongest endorsements yet of an ad hoc
jurisprudence.
In addition, Tahoe-Sierra effectively amended the holding in Lucas.
The Court subtly revised the test in Lucas to one that emphasizes the
destruction of all value, rather than the destruction of all economically
beneficial use, thus limiting both the scope of that decision and its
applicability to similar cases. 39 In so doing, the Tahoe-Sierra decision
also reaffirmed the "parcel as a whole" doctrine, which had come into
question just one year before in Palazzolo.4 ° Under that doctrine, courts
are precluded from considering less than an entire parcel of property for
purposes of deciding whether all value of the property was destroyed by
regulation. Together, these two developments indicate that the Lucas per
se taking rule will almost never be directly on point in regulatory takings

33.

See id. at 1482-84 ("[O]ur decision in Lucas is not dispositive of the question

presented.").
34.

See generally id. at 1485-86 ("With respect to these theories [supporting a

categorical rule], the ultimate constitutional question is whether the concepts of 'fairness
and justice' that underlie the Takings Clause will be better served by one of these
categorical rules or by a Penn Central inquiry into all of the relevant circumstances in

particular cases."). Despite a sparse historical record, there are theories that the Takings
Clause was intended to ensure "justice and fairness"--that is, that some individuals
would not be forced to bear burdens that should be born by the public as a whole. See,
e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and
the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995) [hereinafter Treanor, Takings

Clause].
35. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1487-89.
36. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
37. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489 (quoting Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
38. See id. at 1486 ("The concepts of 'fairness and justice' that underlie the Takings
Clause, of course, are less than fully determinate.").
39. Id. at 1483; see also infra Part III.B. 1.
40. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1484.
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cases, as the likelihood that an entire parcel of property
will have no
41
remaining value due to regulation is exceedingly low.
Further, the Chief Justice's Tahoe-Sierra dissent, as well as the
Court's Palazzolo decision, suggest that the Court is rethinking the scope
of the exception to the per se rule enunciated in Lucas-that
compensation is not due if the regulated use was already barred under
background principles of state nuisance and property law.42 These
opinions imply that a majority of the Court is willing to expand or
narrow its definition of a relevant background principle based on
considerations other than pre-existing state law, creating an exception to
the Lucas per se rule of uncertain breadth. If this is so, then very little of
the clarity effected by Lucas remains, and it appears that the uncertainty
of "background principles of state law" will impact both property owners
and regulators.43
As this article will show, Tahoe-Sierrawill have a profound effect
on the future path of regulatory takings doctrine. More precisely, the
Court's desire for judicial discretion guarantees that regulatory takings
doctrine will not develop any clarity in the foreseeable future. Part II of
this article sets forth the background and justification for the Lucas
"practical equivalence" doctrine in regulatory takings. Part III describes
the holding in Tahoe-Sierra, and Part IV analyzes the doctrinal
significance of that holding. Part V concludes that the Court has adopted
Penn Central as its standard, and will seek to avoid categorical rules in
future regulatory taking cases.
II.

Lucas and the Practical Equivalence Doctrine

Cases such as Lucas do not involve compensation for a direct taking
of property rights, but rather they recognize an indirect taking of physical
41. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled
Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1377 (1993) ("[O]nce the Court lets it be
known that a value deprivation of 95 percent requires no compensation, what legislature
will be foolish enough to take an entire plot of land? Consequently, the Court has
provided an effective blueprint for confiscation that budget-conscious state legislators
will be eager to follow to the letter. His 'occasional result' will become the constitutional
norm: Partial takings, such as those effected by the 'special permit provisions' of the
1990 Amendments to the BMA [the Act at issue in Lucas], though virtually total in their
form, will remain uncompensated.") [hereinafter Epstein, A Tangled Web]. Professor
Epstein's argument applies more strongly after Tahoe-Sierra, since Lucas left the
question open whether a ninety-five percent diminution would fall under the per se rule.
42. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
43. In Palazzolo, discussed at length below, the Court held that background
principles of state law did not prohibit a taking claim by a property owner who acquired
the property after enactment of the relevant regulation. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606 (2001). This holding suggests that the uncertainties of takings law will impact
regulators as well as property owners.
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property that results from the regulation of that property. 4
The
regulation of property rights, viewed in functional terms, is understood in
this context as an equivalent of taking the physical property in which
those rights inhere. The government must accordingly compensate for
taking a fee simple, despite the fact that the owner did not actually lose
the fee simple in its entirety as a formal matter-some rights usually
remain in the property even where it retains no economically beneficial
uses. 45 It is the practical effect on the physical property-the effective
ouster of possession-that is dispositive in such instances.
This connection to physical property is doctrinally significant.
Defining "property" in the takings context is crucial to applying the
clause, but doing so is an increasingly muddled effort.46 Intangible
property rights are sometimes treated as property and sometimes not
treated as property. For example, the courts have found a taking where
regulations destroy the right to devise property, but not where regulations
destroy the right to sell property.47 The uncertain meaning of takings
"property" in the regulatory context is a primary reason why the holding
in Lucas is so important to regulatory takings doctrine, as Lucas links the
Takings Clause to property that is indisputably covered-the fee simple

44. This should not be interpreted to mean that the taking is "indirect" in the sense
that regulation directed at other subject matter has an incidental effect on the property's
value. Such consequences are generally not compensable. See, e.g., The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551-52 (1870) ("[The Takings Clause] has always been
understood as referring to only a direct appropriation, and not to consequential injuries
resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been supposed to have any
bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals.").
45. See Huffman, supra note 23, at 603 n.46 ("The distinction between regulatory
impact and physical occupation is real if, under the regulation in question, the property
owner retains the right to exclude third parties (including the government).").
46. For a valuable discussion of the need to define property for purposes of applying
the Takings Clause, see D. Benjamin Barros, Note, Defining 'Property' in the Just
Compensation Clause, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1853 (1995). Although property rights are
frequently defined by state common law, a federal element is necessarily present when
applying a federal text. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional
Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 934-35 (2000); Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of
Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1412-13 (1991); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 435-38 (1977).
47. Compare Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (holding that a regulation of the
right of tribe members to pass on property to heirs was a taking), and Babbitt v. Youpee,
519 U.S. 234 (1997) (same), with Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) ("[T]he
denial of one traditional property right [the right of sale] does not always amount to a
taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety."). Justice Scalia, concurring in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704
(1987), argued that the Court's opinion limited Andrus to its facts. See id. at 719 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Whether or not this is so, the Court's holdings regarding the destruction
of a single strand from the property rights bundle are clearly inconsistent.
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in land.4 8
In order to appreciate the role that a functional analysis holds, a
Some
brief review of the historical background is necessary.
commentators argue that the original understanding of the Takings
Clause extended only to direct, physical takings. 49 The basis for this
claim is dubious. 50 Although the original understanding of the Takings
Clause is open to debate, there were nevertheless broad understandings
of property during the founding era, 51 and there is historical evidence to
support a broad reading of the Takings Clause that would cover
regulatory takings. 2 The modem legal understanding of "property"
under the Takings Clause views property as a collection of rights.53
48. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
49. See, e.g., John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significancefor Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996) (arguing against modem
regulatory takings doctrine on the basis of colonial land use regulation); Treanor, Takings
Clause, supra note 34, at 783 ("While the evidence of original intent is limited, it clearly
indicates that the Takings Clause was intended to apply only to physical takings .... ");
Bernard Schwartz, Takings Clause- "PoorRelation" No More?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 417,
420 (1994) (finding that James Madison's choice of words supports the notion that the
clause was only intended to cover direct, physical takings); William Michael Treanor,
Note, The Origins and OriginalSignificance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985) [hereinafter Treanor, Just Compensation
Clause]; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1057 n.23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
50. See Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original Intent: The Direct,
Physical Takings Thesis "Goes too Far," 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999) (arguing that
sparse historical record is inconclusive, but that founding era thinkers and early judicial
holdings support compensation for regulatory takings); Kobach, supra note 6; see also
BERNARD SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND LAND-

USE REGULATIONS 21 (1997) (arguing that Madison's revision of draft of the Takings
Clause indicates broad interpretation.); JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT 56 (1992) (arguing that Madison had a broad view of the Takings Clause.).
51. See, e.g., David Schultz, Political Theory and Legal History: Conflicting
Depictions of Property in the American PoliticalFounding, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 464
(1993); Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 273, 276-78 (1991).
52. One of the more persuasive arguments in this regard is the extremely broad
understanding of property exemplified in James Madison's Property. According to
Madison:
[T]hat is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where arbitrary
restrictions, exemptions, and monopolies deny part of its citizens that free use
of their faculties, and free choice of occupations, which not only constitute their
property in the general sense of the word; but are the means of acquiring
property strictly so called.
James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprintedin 14 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 266 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). For a more in-depth analysis
of this essay in the context of the Takings Clause, see Gold, supra note 50, at 200-04
(discussing different interpretations of Madison's writing). See also ELY, supra note 50,
at 56; Laura S. Underkuffler, On Property:An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 136 (1990).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945)
(noting that the word "property" in the Takings Clause "may have been employed in a
more accurate sense to denote the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the
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Despite the modem conception of property as a "bundle of sticks," a
regulatory taking of one stick from the bundle is not automatically
viewed by the courts as a taking of property. 5 4 Regulatory takings are
frequently viewed in terms of their similarity to physical takings, and the
property at issue is often characterized as physical property."
A
regulation that permits physical invasion of property is more likely to
require compensation,5 6 and dissimilarity to a physical taking is often an
effective bar to a claim for just compensation.
Originalism concerns might animate this emphasis on physical
property to some degree.57 However, arguments that the original
understanding of the Takings Clause extended only to physical takings
are beside the point when a "taking" is understood in functional terms,

particular thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it").
54. See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (denying compensation where
one "stick," the right to sell, was removed).
55. Cf Paul, supranote 46, at 1404-05 ("The physicalist model is appealing because
it holds out hope for simultaneously resolving private law controversies and
constitutional disputes. In short, if courts could take their cues concerning the essence of
ownership from a designated set of physically owned things, these things could form the
core of the individualized property right protected against both citizen intrusion and
government interference."); see also id. at 1418-23 (discussing strengths and weaknesses
of the physicalist model).
56. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979) ("In this
case, we hold that the 'right to exclude,' so universally held to be a fundamental element
of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot
take without just compensation. This is not a case in which the Government is exercising
its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of
petitioners' private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this
context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina."); Nollan
v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987) ("We think a 'permanent physical
occupation' has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a
permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may
continuously be traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station
himself permanently on the premises."). Professor Frank Michelman has interpreted
Nollan as a case involving physical takings, rather than regulatory takings. See
Michelman, supra note 12, at 1608 ("Nollan holds that when state regulatory action
imposes permanent physical occupation conditionally rather than unconditionally, the
aggrieved owner can challenge state regulatory action 'as' a 'taking,' and thereby obtain
a certain form of intensified judicial scrutiny of the condition's instrumental merit or
urgency."). But see Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause Is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1630, 1651-52 (1988)
(suggesting the heightened scrutiny of regulations applied in Nollan may apply more
generally to regulatory takings cases) [hereinafter Kmiec, The OriginalUnderstanding].
57. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992) ("Justice
Blackmun is correct that early constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause
embraced regulations of property at all, but even he does not suggest (explicitly at least)
that we renounce the Court's contrary concern in Mahon. Since the text of the Clause
can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical deprivations ... we decline to do
so as well."); see also Treanor, Takings Clause, supra note 34; Treanor, Just
Compensation Clause, supra note 49.
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since a functional reading of the Takings Clause understands certain
regulations as effective physical takings. It is probable that a primary
impetus for modem courts to address physical property, rather than the
intangible property rights that inhere in that property, has been Justice
Holmes's warning that not every diminution in property value should be
considered a regulatory taking. 58 Yet this caution does not provide a
conceptual justification for failing to compensate a de facto physical
taking that occurs via regulation.
As the Lucas Court emphasized, compensation for regulatory
takings can be justified by the functional similarity between the effect of
a regulation and a direct, physical taking of property.5 9 This practical
60
equivalence doctrine can also be traced to Pennsylvania Coal.
Although Pennsylvania Coal is frequently cited as the beginning of the
Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, 61 the idea that
government acts should be viewed functionally for takings purposes long
predates that decision and is rooted in the nineteenth century.
The seminal Supreme Court case to recognize the functional effect
of government action for takings purposes is Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co. 62 Pumpelly, decided in 1871, involved the Wisconsin takings clause,
which the Court found was equivalent to the Federal Takings Clause.63
The Green Bay Company, pursuant to a state statute, built a dam that
flooded Pumpelly's property. 64
The Court concluded that this
destruction of Pumpelly's land constituted a compensable taking. 65 Its
explanation for this holding has cropped up repeatedly in later decisions:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a
provision of constitutional law, always understood to have been
58. But cf RIcHARD A. EPsTEIN, TAKINGS (1985) (arguing that all regulations that
take property rights are takings of property).
59. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017; see also John A. Humbach, "Taking" the Imperial
Judiciary Seriously: Segmenting PropertyInterests and Judicial Revision of Legislative
Judgments, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 771, 812 (1993) ("[W]hat Justice Holmes did was
simply to treat as the generic equivalent of a physical taking that which had, in function
and effect, exactly the same result as a physical taking."). Professor John A. Humbach
notes that, in Lucas, the Court took the equivalence doctrine a step further than
regulations that remove all use of property, it introduced a "value" component: numerous
non-valuable property uses may remain, but so long as there is no valuable use, the Court
still recognizes an equivalent to a physical taking. Id.
60. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) ("To make it
commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.").
61. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122
S. Ct. 1465, 1480 (2002); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014.
62. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
63. Id. at 176-77.
64. Id. at 171.
65. Id. at 182.
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adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as
against the government .... it shall be held that if the government
refrains from the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of
the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict irreparable and
permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total
destruction without making any compensation, because,
in the
66
narrowest sense of the word, it is not taken for public use.
This reasoning, involving a government action that left the owner in
technical possession of the property but without any remaining value in
it, has provided a strong basis for the award of just compensation for
regulatory takings.
This functional reasoning is just as applicable when the source of
the destruction of property value is the government's regulatory power.67
In a famous dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego,6 Justice Brennan cited Pumpelly for the principle that there is an
"essential similarity of regulatory 'takings' and other 'takings, ' ' 69 and
noted that, "[f]rom the property owner's point of view, it may matter
little whether his land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted
by regulation to use in its natural state,
if the effect in both cases is to
70
deprive him of all beneficial use of it."
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas looked to Justice
Brennan's argument for support:
"We have never set forth the
justification for this rule [that destruction of all economically beneficial
use is a per se taking]. Perhaps it is simply, as Justice Brennan
suggested, that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the
' 71
landowner's point of view, the equivalent of physical appropriation."
The Lucas Court added that there were other reasons for the rule. The
Court noted that it would be less realistic to assume that such a
regulation secures an "average reciprocity of advantage" to everyone

66. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis in original). This language, incidentally, shows a strong
similarity in language to the reasoning later expressed in Pennsylvania Coal respecting
destruction of value. Professor William Michael Treanor contends that Pumpelly is an
exceptional case in that "the government action in Pumpelly gave rise to a compensation
requirement because it was a de facto physical taking." See Treanor, Takings Clause,
supra note 34, at 795-96 n.74. The point here, however, is that regulatory takings can
also be seen as de facto physical takings.
67. See Gold, supra note 50, at 237 ("The logic of Pumpelly, however, would also
support compensation for any de facto direct taking ....It does not require a physical
invasion for the government to utterly destroy the value of a property, and thus all but
take the title to the property by means of regulating the property owner's rights of
usage.").
68. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
69. Id. at 651 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
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concerned.72 The phrase "average reciprocity of advantage," discussed
in greater detail in Part IV, apparently denotes those instances where the
property owner is actually benefited by the regulation of his property so
as not to require compensation. The Court also stated that the concern
that "government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law" would not apply to "the relatively rare situations"
where the government destroyed all economically beneficial use of
land.73 The latter two reasons, however, were not affirmative reasons for
a per se rule, but rather they were reasons why a per se rule would not be
undesirable.74
The Lucas Court's substantive justification for a per se rule was the
equivalence of such regulations to physical takings. 75 Justice Scalia
noted that regulations that destroy all economically beneficial uses-for
example a requirement that land be left in its natural state---"carry with
them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service. 7 6 Again, Justice Scalia turned to Justice
Brennan for support: "From the government's point of view, the benefits
flowing to the public from preservation of open space through regulation
may be equally great as from creating a wildlife refuge though formal
condemnation or increasing electricity production through a dam project
that floods private property. 77 The Court noted that the many state and
federal statutes that provide for the use of eminent domain to prevent
developmental uses, or to acquire the land altogether, "suggest the
practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and
78
appropriation.,
Moreover, the practical equivalence doctrine caused the Lucas
Court to refine the "noxious use" doctrine in regulatory takings law.79 A
long line of cases prior to Lucas had barred compensation where the
72. Id. at 1017-18.
73. Seeid.at 1018.
74. This point is partly made in Justice Stevens's dissent, in which he argued that the
Court's rarity argument "begs the question of why regulations of this particular class
should always be found to effect takings." See id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
With respect to the "average reciprocity of advantage argument," the Lucas majority
characterized this justification in terms of the absence of a functional basis for denying
compensation. Id. at 1017. The absence of a functionalist counterargument is not a
substantive foundation for a per se rule.
75. Seeid. at 1017.
76. Seeid.at 1018.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1018-19. The Court's analysis from the government's perspective
underlines the similarity of the regulation to an exercise of eminent domain, rather than a
physical appropriation. Id.
79. See id.
at 1022-26.
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regulation at issue sought to prevent "harmful or noxious uses" of land.80
In Lucas, the Court clarified the extent of this rule. The Court
determined that there was no meaningful distinction between regulations
that prevent harmful uses and regulations that confer benefits.8
The
inability to limit the definition of harm-preventing regulations meant
that-pursuant to the noxious use doctrine-the police power could
swallow the Takings Clause in the regulatory context because a state
government could almost always point to a public harm it had sought to
prevent.
Rather than defer to state characterizations of regulations as
preventing harmful uses, the Lucas Court held that the rule for physical
takings must also apply to "confiscatory regulations. '8 3 The rule for
physical takings does not permit a police-power exception to
compensation based on a harm-preventing characterization of the
government act. Where permanent physical occupation is concerned, the
rule is that the government's action is a taking without regard to the
public interests it may serve.8 4 Lucas extended this principle to
regulations that destroy all economically beneficial uses of land. 5
But this did not mean that the "noxious use" precedents would be
jettisoned. The Court explained that there was a context in which policepower regulation of harms should go uncompensated: where the
restriction on use "inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance
already place upon land ownership." 86 This reaffirmed the "noxious use"
precedent, but in a limited form. 7 Following Lucas, only laws that
duplicate the result that could already have been achieved in the courts
under the state's law of nuisance (or certain similar safety-related cases)

80. See id. at 1022 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).

81. See id. at 1024 ("It is quite possible, for example, to describe in either fashion
the ecological, economic, and esthetic concerns that inspired the South Carolina
Legislature in the present case.").
82. See id. at 1026.
83. Id. at 1029.
84. See id. at 1028 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).
85. See id. at 1029 ("We believe similar treatment must be accorded to confiscatory
regulations, i.e., regulations that prohibit all economically beneficial use of land .....

86. See id.
87. See id. at 1023-27 (describing noxious use precedents as a progenitor of modem
statements limiting compensation where a regulation substantially advances state
interests and interpreting that requirement in the Lucas context). But cf id. at 1068
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the nuisance exception as understood by the Lucas
majority rejects the holding in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
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fall under the "noxious use" exception. 88 This correlation to the common
law of nuisance is in accord with the probable original understanding of
the Takings Clause.89
Thus, the Court's recognition of practical equivalence produced two
bright-line rules in Lucas: (1) a destruction of all economically
beneficial use of land is categorically a compensable taking, and (2) the
strength of the public interests supporting a regulation is irrelevant,
except insofar as the property rights at issue were already barred under
background principles of state nuisance and property law. These brightline rules stand in sharp contrast to the judicial balancing favored in Penn
Central.90
The Tahoe-Sierra decision challenges the first rule, and the
dissenting opinion, combined with the Court's recent decision in
Palazzolo, suggests that the clarity of the second rule is in jeopardy. It
appears that a majority of the Justices are uncomfortable with the
implications of Lucas's categorical reasoning.
III. The Tahoe-SierraHolding
A.

Background

In 1968, in an effort to conserve the natural splendor of Lake Tahoe,
California and Nevada entered into an interstate compact, the Tahoe
Regional Planning Compact. 91 This compact created an agency known
as the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency ("TRPA"), which regulated
development in the region. 92 At issue in Tahoe-Sierrawere two TRPAenacted moratoria that, for approximately thirty-two months, prohibited
virtually all development on a substantial portion of the property subject
to the TRPA's jurisdiction. 93 However, following a challenge to the

88. See id. at 1029.
89. See Kmiec, The Original Understanding, supra note 56, at 1635 ("Legal
dictionaries at the time of the founding paralleled Blackstone, noting that the law
precluded the use of the property in a manner that would 'injure his neighbor.'
Significantly, the drafter of the taking clause, James Madison, incorporated the
Blackstonian definition in his writing on property and specifically excluded uses of
property that harmed others by not 'leav[ing] to every one else the like advantage."')
(brackets in original).
90. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
91. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66800 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 277.190 (2002).
Congress approved the Compact in 1969. See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub.
L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969). For additional background, see Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1471-72
(2002) (describing the history and details of the Compact).
92. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471.
93. See id. at 1472-73.
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second moratorium as insufficiently stringent, a federal district court
issued a permanent injunction on development, extending the effective
prohibition on development to nearly six years.94
The plaintiffs brought suit in federal district court alleging a taking
without just compensation. The district court held that no taking had
occurred under a Penn Central analysis, 95 but concluded that the
plaintiffs had been temporarily deprived of all economically beneficial
use of their land, thus triggering the categorical analysis set forth in
Lucas.96 The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had been
deprived of the use of their property for approximately three years, and
that they were accordingly entitled to just compensation. 97 Both parties
appealed, but the plaintiffs did not appeal the Penn Centralportion of the
ruling.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. 98 The panel first concluded
that it would be inappropriate to limit the parcel of property at issue to
the time period during which the moratorium precluded all use. Citing a
series of Supreme Court holdings that precluded dividing the parcel of
property into smaller segments, 99 it determined that the parcel of property
could not be severed along the temporal dimension. 0 0° The panel also
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in First English, which
permitted compensation for temporary regulatory takings, had not
actually determined what constitutes a temporary taking.' 0 1 The panel
then determined that Lucas did not apply, both because there was
remaining value to the property and because there were future
economically beneficial uses after the temporary moratorium came to an
end.102 A motion for rehearing en banc was denied, with Judge Kozinski,
94. See id. at 1473.
95. See id. at 1475.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 1476.
98. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d
764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
99. Id.at 774-75 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 497-99 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 116 (1978)).
100. Id. at 779.
101. Id. at 777-78 ("First English is not even a case about what constitutes a
taking."). This perspective was not shared by Justices Thomas and Scalia. See TahoeSierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (interpreting First English as rejecting
the idea that the Court must view the parcel as a whole for determining the existence of a
temporary regulatory taking).
102. The Court avoided deciding whether economically beneficial use under Lucas
referred to use of property or its value. See Tahoe-Sierra,216 F.3d at 780-81 ("Clearly,
the economic value of property provides strong evidence of the availability of
'economically beneficial or productive uses' of that property. Nevertheless, there are
instances in which certain kinds of 'value' may be poor measures of the existence of such
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03
joined by four other judges, strongly dissenting.1
Judge Kozinski argued that the panel had effectively adopted Justice
Stevens's dissent in FirstEnglish, which rejected the conclusion "that all
ordinances which would constitute takings if allowed to remain in effect
permanently, necessarily also constitute takings if they are in effect for
only a limited period of time.' 0 4 Further, Judge Kozinski claimed that
the panel's opinion directly conflicted with Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United
States,10 5 in which the Federal Circuit held that "a taking, even for a day,
without compensation is prohibited by the Constitution."'' 0 6 He noted:
"Under the panel's ruling in our case, a taking for a day could never
require compensation, because despite the temporary deprivation, the
property would retain almost all of its value based upon its expected
future uses."'10 7 Judge Kozinski contended that the panel had improperly
"view[ed] the regulation's effect on a property's value as the taking
itself, rather than a test for whether the government [had] deprived the
owner of the benefits of his property."'' 0 8 Finally, he concluded that the
panel's result conflicted with First English, as the First English Court
held that a temporary regulation is not different in kind from a permanent

one. °9

uses. In any event, we need not resolve the sticky issues surrounding the meaning and
proof of the existence of 'economically beneficial or productive uses,' because it is
clear.., that the temporary moratorium imposed by these regulations did not deprive the
plaintiffs' land in the Lake Tahoe Basin of either all of its 'value' or all of its 'use."').
103. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d
998, 999 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), denying reh 'g en banc to 216 F.3d 764
(9th Cir. 2000), aft'd, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
104. See id. at 1000 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987)) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); see also id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("While the opinion nowhere cites
Justice Stevens's First English dissent, the reasoning-and even the wording-bear an
uncanny resemblance.").
105. 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
106. See Tahoe-Sierra, 228 F.3d at 1001 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Tabb
Lakes, 10 F.3d at 800).
dissenting).
107. See id. (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). For more discussion of this issue, see infra
108. See id. (Kozinski, J.,
notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
109. See Tahoe-Sierra, 228 F.3d at 1002 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("It is true that
FirstEnglish did not have to determine whether there was a temporary taking, because it
accepted the state court's conclusion that a regulation prohibiting all development was a
taking while it was in effect.... But FirstEnglish did decide that a temporary regulation
is 'not different in kind' from a permanent one: If either deprives the owner of all use of
his property, then the owner is entitled to compensation for the taking.") (citing First
English, 482 U.S. at 318).
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The Supreme Court Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit decision. 11 0 It began
its analysis by arguing that "[t]he text of the Fifth Amendment itself
provides a basis for drawing a distinction between physical takings and
'
regulatory takings."111
According to the Court, the "plain language" of
the Takings Clause requires compensation whenever the government
acquires property for a public purpose, "whether the acquisition is the
1' 12
result of a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation."
However, the Court added:
"But the Constitution contains no
comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from
' 13
making certain uses of her private property."'
Notably, the Court did not cite the plain language of the Takings
Clause, which refers to neither eminent domain, physical appropriation,
nor regulatory takings.' 1 4 The text is unspecific. Without more
discussion, it is hard to guess to what the Tahoe-SierraCourt might have
been referring when it claimed that the plain language covered the first
two instances (condemnation and physical appropriation), but not the
third instance (regulation). Moreover, the Court's categorical rule that
physical invasions of property are compensable no matter how small the
invasion is-itself based on the similarity between physical invasions and
exercises of the eminent domain power,1 5 suggesting that the "plain
language" of the constitutional text does not provide a basis for the
proposed distinction.
A footnote indicates that the Tahoe-Sierra Court was also
110. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct.
1465 (2002).
111. See id. at 1478.
112. See id.
113. See id. But cf.Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992)
("[T]he text of the clause can be read to encompass regulatory as well as physical
deprivations ....); Treanor, Just Compensation Clause, supra note 49, at 711 (noting
that "a broader reading would not do violence to the text"). Furthermore, the text is
slightly amended from its originally proposed form, which had provided for
compensation where a party was "obliged to relinquish his property." See 1 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834), reprinted in BENNETr B. PATrERSON, THE
FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 93-217 (1955). Several commentators have read the

change to the word "taken" as an indication that the text supports compensation for
regulatory takings. See, e.g., SIEGAN, supra note 50, at 21; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1028 n.15.
114. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
115. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 427 (1982)
(citing Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872) (standing for the
principle that physical invasions are compensable)); see also id.at 435 ("Property rights
in a physical thing have been described as the rights 'to possess, use and dispose of it.'
To the extent that the government permanently occupies physical property, it effectively
destroys each of these rights.") (citation omitted).
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concerned with the pragmatic difficulties in determining when "a law or
regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a
condemnation or appropriation,"'"1 6 difficulties that are in notable
contrast to the simplicity of finding a taking where there is a physical
invasion of property.
Indeed, there is greater complexity where
regulatory takings are involved, at least where the regulatory taking is
not obviously akin to a physical ouster of possession. The Court's
reasoning, however, suffers from a logical flaw. The alleged difficulty in
determining when a regulation is tantamount to a direct condemnation or
appropriation does not conceptually justify a Penn Central balancing
test. Penn Central balances factors that in no way indicate that a
regulation is similar or dissimilar to an appropriation or condemnation." 17
In a condemnation situation the government must pay just compensation
when it exercises its eminent domain power, irrespective of the strength
of the government's interest in the condemnation. Penn Central, in
contrast, may find support for a denial of compensation if the
government interest is especially strong." 8 This distinction between
regulations and physical appropriations-the degree of complexity in
determining when they are functionally equivalent-provides a logical
basis for different treatment of regulations only to the extent that distinct
treatment reflects the different effect a regulation has on a parcel of
property.
The Court then presented an argument that was probably the true
motivation for drawing its distinction. According to the Tahoe-Sierra
majority:
For the same reason that we do not ask whether a physical
appropriation advances a substantial government interest or whether
it deprives the owner of all economically valuable use, we do not
apply our precedent from the physical takings context to regulatory
takings claims. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of
116. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478 n.17 ("When the government condemns or
physically appropriates the property, the fact of a taking is typically obvious and
undisputed. When, however, the owner contends a taking has occurred because a law or
regulation imposes restrictions so severe that they are tantamount to a condemnation or
appropriation, the predicate of a taking is not self-evident, and the analysis is more
complex.").
117. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
These aspects of Penn Central are rooted in questions of "fairness and justice," and it is
hard to see how they might enable a court to resolve the complexities of determining
whether a regulation is "tantamount to a condemnation or appropriation." See TahoeSierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478 n.17. There is no explanation of how a regulation supported by
a strong government interest, for example, is somehow more or less like an act of
condemnation, and indeed the text of the Takings Clause makes no distinction based on
the government's purposes outside of the "public use" language.
118.

Penn Central,438 U.S. at 144-45.
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them impact property values in some tangential way--often in
completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few
governments could afford. By contrast, physical appropriations are
relatively rare, easily identified, and
usually represent a greater
9
affront to individual property rights."
The argument is an intriguing one, as it suggests that the applicability of
constitutional text should depend in part on the degree to which it affects
the public fisc. 120 The Court, however, in no way denied that regulations
may amount to physical takings-it simply warned against treating all
regulations that affect property as physical takings. 12 1 But no one argued
that all regulations that tangentially impact property values should be
treated as per se takings, and even the strongest proponents of
compensation for regulatory takings distinguish regulations that only
indirectly affect property values. 122 In addition, read broadly, the Court's
reasoning implies that, if physical appropriations become frequent
enough, it might be appropriate to start weighing the import of the
government interest or the extent of the economic impact to determine
whether a physical invasion merits compensation, 23 a result in tension
with current understandings of the Takings Clause.
1.

The Court's Interpretation of Lucas

Next, the Tahoe-Sierra Court turned to the question of whether

119. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479.
120. It is reasonable to argue that an interpretation of the Takings Clause that would
have bankrupted the federal government at the time of the founding is not the best
understanding of the original meaning of the text, but that is not the argument being made
in Tahoe-Sierra. Even in light of the various land-use regulations extant at the time of
the founding, there is little reason to think the Founders anticipated the present regulatory
state. Cf Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1872 (2002)
("The Framers, who envisioned a limited Federal Government, could not have anticipated
the vast growth of the administrative state.").
121. This pragmatism can be found as far back as Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922). But the Tahoe-SierraCourt's suggestion that "treating them all" as
per se takings would be too costly argues against a theory of compensation not presented
in Tahoe-Sierra. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479.
122. See, e.g., Epstein, A Tangled Web, supra note 41, at 1376 ("There is a broad
class of actions that are damnum absque injuria (harm without legal injury) at common
law, of which competition is perhaps the most important illustration. The same idea
applies in the law of eminent domain. The reductions in value are thus, by themselves,
irrelevant to the overall analysis."). A more detailed analysis is located in EPsTEIN, supra
note 58, at 198.
123. This result would be similar to the view proposed in Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1992), which would
have applied a Penn Central balancing test even in cases of permanent physical
occupation of real property. See id. at 442-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Lucas applied to temporary regulatory takings, beginning with an
analysis of the cases that led up to Lucas. 24 Starting with Pennsylvania
Coal, the Court worked its way through Penn Central, emphasizing the
Penn Central requirement that courts not "divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular
' 25
segment have been entirely abrogated."'
The Tahoe-SierraCourt next reviewed FirstEnglish's holding that
temporary takings are compensable, noting that the First English
decision had expressly disavowed a ruling on whether a taking had
actually occurred in that case. 126 As noted above, Chief Justice
Rehnquist held in First English that invalidation of the statute would not
be a sufficient remedy if a taking were found. The rationale was based
on the equivalence to undisputed takings of property. The First English
Court concluded that "'temporary' takings which, as here, deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from
permanent takings,
for which the Constitution clearly requires
27
compensation."
The Tahoe-Sierra majority explained that the First English Court
had identified two situations when a regulation that temporarily denied a
property owner of all use of his or her property might not be a taking:
first, where the denial of all use was part of the state's authority to enact
safety regulations, and, second, where "normal delays in obtaining
building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like"
are at issue. 28 The Court accordingly concluded that First English did
not approve, and implicitly rejected, a categorical rule for regulations
that temporarily destroy all economically beneficial uses of property. 29
The Court finally turned to Lucas. Its Lucas analysis hinged on the
remaining value of future uses of the property. The Tahoe-SierraCourt
noted Lucas's "deprivation of all economically beneficial uses" rule, and
concluded that it does not apply unless there is a "complete elimination
of value."' 130 Further, it concluded, like the Ninth Circuit, that it was
124. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1480.
125. See id. at 1481 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 130-31 (1978)). For additional analysis of this doctrine, see infra Part IV.B.
126. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482 ("In fact, First English expressly
disavowed any ruling on the merits of the takings issue because the California courts had
decided the remedial question on the assumption that a taking had been alleged."). But
cf id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("I had thought that First English put to rest the
notion that the 'relevant denominator' is land's infinite life.").
127. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987).
128.

See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 313,

321).
129.

See id.

130.

See id. at 1483 ("Anything less than a 'complete elimination of value,' or a 'total
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inappropriate to view the regulation in terms of its effect on the property
for the segment of time when it prohibited all use.13' Instead, the
property had to be viewed in its entirety, including along the temporal
dimension. 132 If there was not a total taking of the entire parcel, Penn
Central balancing would apply. 133 In light of this rule, and the Court's
value-based reading of Lucas, the per se Lucas rule would not apply to
temporary regulations. "Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be
rendered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because
34
the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.'
2.

The Fairness and Justice Inquiry

Having rejected the application of Lucas and First English, the
Court stated that it would nevertheless "consider whether the interest in
protecting individual property owners from bearing public burdens
'which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,' justifies creating a new rule for these circumstances."' 35 This
reference to burdens that, "in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
loss,' the Court acknowledged, would require the kind of analysis applied in Penn
Central.") (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019-20 n.8 (1992)).
13 1. See id. ("Of course, defining the property interest taken in terms of the very
regulation being challenged is circular. With property so divided, every delay would
become a total ban; the moratorium and the normal permit process alike would constitute
categorical takings. Petitioners' 'conceptual severance' argument is unavailing because it
ignores Penn Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on 'the
parcel as a whole."') (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31). Although the "parcel
as a whole" doctrine may apply in this context, it is worth noting that there is no
circularity to defining the property interest in terms of the regulation being challenged.
One might justify the rejected definition of the property interest by noting that the
property regulated is the only interest that arguably would be taken by the regulation as it
is the only property affected. Generally, it would make little sense to say that
unregulated property had been taken Cf Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1016 n.7 (1992) ("When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one
in which the owner had been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened
portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value
of the tract as a whole."). Such an analysis may determine the result under Lucas, but
that does not make for circular reasoning; it simply mandates a result different from the
Court's predilection for balancing.
132. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483 (stating that the district court erred by
viewing property in terms of temporal segments).
133. See id. at 1483-84 ("The starting point for the Court's analysis should have been
to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Centralwas
the proper framework.").
134. See id. at 1484. But cf id. at 1497 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("But the 'logical'
assurance that a 'temporary restriction ... merely causes a diminution in value,' is cold
comfort to the property owners in this case or any other. After all, 'in the long run we are
all dead."') (citations omitted).
135. See id. at 1484.
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the public as a whole" (originally expressed in Armstrong v. United
States136) is frequently cited by the Court as the standard for when
regulatory takings merit compensation.
The Court's use of the Armstrong test as a limit on the development
of categorical rules is a novel one, however, 37 and further undermined
the foundations of Lucas. The Armstrong test, emphasizing vague
concepts of fairness and justice in takings determinations, is very much a
driving force behind the utilitarian Penn Central calculus, and was
quoted favorably in that opinion.138 By applying a Penn Central-style
balancing of factors to determine whether an exception to Penn Central
is appropriate, the Court did not necessarily predetermine the outcome of
its analysis. But it did turn Lucas on its head. The entire point in
Lucas-the archetypal exception to Penn Central-was that balancing of
these factors was inappropriate based on circumstances that indicated per
se that a taking occurred. 139 To balance those factors when considering
future per se rules is to reject implicitly the idea that regulatory takings
may occur without antecedent reference to Penn Central.
In applying this "fairness and justice" analysis, the Court gave
sufficient weight to an excerpt from Justice O'Connor's Palazzolo
concurrence that it bears repeating:
Our polestar ... remains the principles set forth in Penn Centralitself
and our other cases that govern partial regulatory takings. Under
these cases, interference with investment-backed expectations is one
of a number of factors that a court must examine.... The concepts
of "fairness and justice" that underlie the Takings Clause, of course,
are less than fully determinate. Accordingly, we have eschewed "any
'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the
government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a
few persons." The outcome instead
140 depends largely "upon the
particular circumstances in that case."
136. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
137. The novelty may stem from the fact that categorical rules were rare in regulatory
takings jurisprudence prior to Lucas. Loretto is an arguable example of such a
categorical rule. See Lorretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982).
138. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978).
139. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (distinguishing
Penn Central and discussing contexts for per se rules); id. at 1019 ("We think, in short,
that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner of
real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.").
140. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606, 633 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107:3

As this quotation indicates, the Tahoe-Sierra "fairness and justice"
inquiry is itself intertwined with Penn Central, and is consciously based
on indeterminate concepts. The Tahoe-Sierra Court effectively applied
Penn Central factors to determine whether to deviate from Penn
14
Central. 1
Finally, the Court concluded that a categorical rule regarding
moratoria (even a narrow rule), would "impose serious financial
constraints on the planning process., 142 The Court determined, based on
an apparent "consensus in the planning c7ommunity," that moratoria are
an essential element of successful development. 43 In light of the
"interest in protecting the decisional process,"'' 44 and an alleged average
reciprocity of advantage to landowners in the region because they could
benefit from the regulation of other landowners, 45 the Court held that a
categorical rule was inappropriate.
IV. Significance of the Tahoe-SierraHolding
The true significance of Tahoe-Sierra is found by reviewing the
dissenting opinions, which set forth alternative understandings of what
constitutes a regulatory taking. 146 Both dissenting opinions indicate how
far the Court majority has departed from its thinking in Lucas. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's dissent demonstrates that a practical equivalence
reasoning in Tahoe-Sierra would not have to result in an omnipresent
compensation requirement for temporary regulations of property. 147 His
dissent also suggests, however, that the limited definition of "background
principles of state property law" espoused in Lucas may be losing
adherents on the Court. 4 8 Instead, an expectations-based definition of
"background principles" is prevailing.
Justice Thomas's dissent, questioning the Court's affirmation of the
"parcel as a whole" doctrine, highlights a problem that the Lucas opinion
flagged but left unresolved. 49 In the physical taking context, the

141. Id.at 1486-87.
142. Id. at 1486 ("A narrower rule that excluded normal delays associated with
processing permits, or that covered delays of more than a year, would certainly have a
less severe impact on prevailing practices, but it would still impose serious financial
constraints on the planning process.").
143. Id. at 1487.
144. Id. at 1488 (describing the strength of the interest in protecting the decisional
process).
145. Id. at 1489 ("At least with a moratorium there is a clear 'reciprocity of
advantage."') (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
146. See id.at 1490 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 1490-96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 1494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 1496-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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relevant parcel of property is the parcel that the government invaded. In
contrast, in the regulatory context, the Court has frequently stated that it
is the "parcel as a whole" that must be considered when determining the
impact of a regulation on property, rather than just the segment of
property that is affected by the regulation. This "parcel as a whole"
requirement came into question in the Court's recent Palazzolo
decision.1 50 In Tahoe-Sierra,the Court broadly reaffirmed the "parcel as
a whole" doctrine, thus ensuring that partial regulatory takings cases
entail a1 very different legal reasoning from partial physical takings
15

cases.

A.

The Rejection of PracticalEquivalenceReasoning

Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Tahoe-Sierra, proposed a
categorical rule for regulations that temporarily destroy all economically
beneficial use of property. 152 Under this rule, such regulations would
constitute per se takings. The Chief Justice's dissent argued that the
distinction between temporary and permanent destruction of
economically beneficial use of property was nowhere to be found in
Lucas, and that the Court had vitiated the practical equivalence
justification for the Lucas per se rule.1 53 A review of his argument
illustrates the incompatibility of the reasoning in Tahoe-Sierra and the
reasoning in Lucas.
1.

The Demise of the Value/Use Distinction

In order to distinguish Lucas from Tahoe-Sierra,the majority recast
the basis of the Lucas decision. 154 As the Chief Justice noted, the
majority read Lucas as "being fundamentally concerned with value rather
than with denial of all economically beneficial or productive use of
land." 155 This description of the majority's argument is essentially right.
150. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 616 (2001) (noting that "we have
at times expressed discomfort with this rule," and adding that this is "a sentiment echoed
by some commentators"). In Palazzolo, the issue was not properly before the Court,
however, and was accordingly left undecided.
151. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1481-84.
152. Id. at 1490-96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1492 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
154. See id at 1482-83.
155. Id. at 1493 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority's references to Lucas in
terms of value are many. See, e.g., id. at 1482 ("These lots were rendered 'valueless' by
a statute enacted two years later."); id. at 1483 ("Anything less than a 'complete
elimination of value,' or a 'total loss,' the [Lucas] Court acknowledged, would require
the kind of analysis applied in Penn Central."); id.("Certainly our holding [in Lucas] that
the permanent 'obliteration of the value' of a fee simple estate constitutes a categorical
taking .... "); id. at 1484 ("Logically, a fee estate cannot be rendered valueless by a
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The crucial respect in which the majority distinguished56Lucas is that a
partial taking does not destroy all value of the property. 1
Where the Ninth Circuit was reluctant to decide the "sticky issue"
of how value and use interrelate under Lucas,' 57 the Tahoe-Sierra Court
felt no such qualms. It defined them as identical. 158 There is some irony
in the source of this holding, though. In Lucas, Justice Stevens dissented
because in his view the "deprivation of all economically beneficial use"
rule was "wholly arbitrary," since "[a] landowner whose property is
diminished in value 95% recovers nothing, while an owner who property
is diminished 100% recovers the land's full value."' 59 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Lucas majority, explained that Justice Stevens was
incorrect, because it is wrong to assume that "the landowner whose
deprivation is one step short of complete is not entitled to
compensation."' 60 Justice Scalia noted that such an owner "might" not
be able to claim the benefit of the categorical rule, but could still recover
under Penn Central.16 1 He further conceded that a landowner with a
ninety-five percent loss might get nothing in "at least some
cases," but
62
situations.''
nothing
or
"all
of
full
is
law
takings
that
noted
Justice Stevens had his revenge in Tahoe-Sierra,by rewriting Lucas
so that it truly is a value-based decision. 163 But a careful reading of the
above exchange indicates that the Lucas Court never held that a
landowner who suffers a ninety-five percent loss in property value
temporary prohibition on economic use .... "); id. ("In fact, these cases make clear that
the categorical rule in Lucas was carved out for the 'extraordinary case' in which a
regulation permanently deprives property of all value ....
").
156. Id. at 1483-84 (explaining the value test and noting that value necessarily
remains in context of temporary regulations).
157. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,
780-81 (9th Cir. 2000), aft'd, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
158. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483-84.
159. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1064 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
160. See id. at 1019 n.8.
161. See id. ("Such an owner might not be able to claim the benefit of our categorical
formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and again, 'the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant and ...the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations' are keenly relevant to takings analysis
generally.") (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
162. See id. ("But that occasional result is no more strange than the gross disparity
between the landowner whose premises are taken for a highway (who recovers in full)
and the landowner whose property is reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway
(who recovers nothing). Takings law is full of these 'all-or-nothing' situations."). Justice
Scalia's example is imperfect, since an indirect loss of value, where there is neither
government intrusion on nor government regulation of property, is not a taking by almost
any theory. Since Justice Stevens's argument would also create all-or-nothing results,
however, Justice Scalia's rhetorical point still has some force.
163. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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Justice Stevens
cannot recover under the Lucas per se rule.
mischaracterized Lucas, changing the Lucas Court's use of the word
"might" into a holding that "the categorical rule would not apply if the
diminution in value were 95% instead of 1 0 0 %."164 The Lucas footnote
did not say this, and Justice Stevens would presumably be aware of this
fact, since the footnote was written in response to his own theory that a
ninety-five percent loss would not trigger the categorical rule.1 65 Justice
Stevens created an arbitrary Lucas holding, by determining that Lucas
does not apply where all economically beneficial use is destroyed, but
only where all economically beneficial use is destroyed and there is no
remaining property value. This holding not only invents an artificial line
between per se compensable regulations and potentially nonthat the Lucas rule might not
compensable regulations, but it suggests
66
have applied even on its own facts.
As the Chief Justice's Tahoe-Sierra dissent noted, in Lucas the
Court did not base its holding on value, but on the loss of economically
164. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct.
1465, 1483 (2002) (emphasis added).
165. In that footnote, the Lucas majority emphasized that Justice Stevens's view "errs
in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step short of complete is
not entitled to compensation." See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8. It is in this context that
the Court said that a property owner might not be able to benefit from the categorical rule
if only ninety-five percent of value was destroyed. Of course, ninety-five percent of
value might be destroyed because the remaining five percent was devoted to an
economically beneficial use (as opposed to mere value based on speculation that a
permanent regulation would be repealed).
166. Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter all questioned the finding of
the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas that the regulation in that case would destroy
all property value. See id. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1043-44
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1076-77
(statement of Souter, J.). But the more fundamental issue is that cases like Lucas would
never present an absolute destruction of value. This point is ably made by Judge
Kozinski in his dissent. As he noted: "Even a permanent prohibition can be rescinded
and, in the fullness of time, almost certainly will be. The land may retain market value
based on speculation that it will someday become usable because the regulation will be
revoked." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d
998, 1001 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J., dissenting), denying reh'g en banc to 216
F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), aff'd, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002); see, e.g., Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stating that land might retain value
because a buyer could "bet that the prohibition of rock mining, to protect the overlying
wetlands, would some day be lifted"). Judge Kozinski's point is similar to the Chief
Judge of the United States Claims Court in FloridaRock Industries,Inc. v. United States,
8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 791 F.2d 893, 902 (Fed. Cir.
1986). See id.at 166 n.6 ("If passively holding land against the possibility that
restrictions on its use will be lifted were deemed a productive economic use, property
would never be rendered useless by regulation and there could be no such thing as a
regulatory taking."). The diminution of Lucas is compounded by the fact that the limits
of its holding will encourage regulation that falls just short of a complete destruction of
all economically beneficial use. See Epstein, A Tangled Web, supra note 41, at 1377.
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beneficial use. 167 The two are not identical. In Lucas, there was no
remaining economically beneficial use, but, as the Chief Justice noted:
"Surely, the land at issue in Lucas retained some market value based on
the contingency, which soon came to fruition, that the development ban
would be amended."' 16 8 The loss of economically beneficial use made it
as if the property owner did not "own" the land, and this is the key to the
Lucas decision. A property without economically beneficial use is very
much like a property that has been physically taken. The Lucas Court
basically said as much, quoting
Sir Edward Coke: "For what is the land
69
but the profits thereof?"'1

Value is not directly linked to the practical equivalence between
regulatory takings and physical takings, and it is hard to see how it could
be. Mere value is not a form of property, and its presence is dictated by
market forces rather than state common law.' 70 Lost value is simply
evidence of lost uses. Economically beneficial uses, on the other hand,
are aspects of property ownership. The Court has suggested that
property may be subject to the Takings Clause even if it has no economic
value. 17 Value consistently has played a role in calculations of what is
72
fair, but has not generally been equated with what has been taken.

167.

Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1493-94 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

168. Id. at 1494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
169. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017 (quoting 1 EDWARD

COKE, INSTITUTES,

ch. 1, § 1 (1st

Am. ed. 1812)).
170. This distinction between property and value came to the fore in the Federal
Circuit's second FloridaRock decision. See Fla. Rock Indust., Inc. v. United States, 18
F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994). There, the panel majority held that, under Penn Central,
compensation could be due for a partial taking of property, without dividing the parcel of
property prior to applying the Penn Central test. The Court explained that the value lost
due to the regulation could, under the right circumstances, also equal the property taken.
Id. at 1572. Chief Judge Nies, dissenting, disagreed: "'Value' is not a property right
under Florida law or any state law that I can uncover. While much of takings law is
unclear, one principle is not. Rights in land depend on the law of the particular state."
Id. at 1575 (Nies, C.J., dissenting). Although the author does not think that FloridaRock
truly implicated Chief Judge Nies's concerns, as the majority was merely recognizing
that the lost value reflected the taken property interest, it is hard to argue with the premise
that value and property are different things. Cf Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) ("[Supreme Court precedent] uniformly reject[s] the
proposition that diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a taking.").
In addition, the original understanding of the Takings Clause does not implicate
diminutions in property value. See Gold, supra note 50, at 242 n.377; Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964) (arguing the diminution in value
theory conflicts with the early natural law theorists' understanding of just compensation).
171. See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169 (1998) ("We have never
held that a physical item is not 'property' simply because it lacks a positive economic or
market value.").
172. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
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2.

Restricting Practical
Compensation

Equivalence

as a

Justification

for

A more basic challenge to the practical equivalence theory lies in
Tahoe-Sierra's distinction between temporary
and permanent
deprivations of all economically beneficial use.' 73 The Chief Justice
accurately explained that the distinction drawn in Tahoe-Sierra would
conflict with the underlying justification for the Lucas per se rule:
More fundamentally, even if a practical distinction between
temporary and permanent deprivations were plausible, to treat the
two differently in terms of takings law would be at odds with the
justification for the Lucas rule. The Lucas rule is derived from the
fact that a "total deprivation of use is, from the landowner's point of
view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." The regulation in
Lucas was the "practical equivalence" of a long-term physical
appropriation, i.e., a condemnation, so the Fifth Amendment required
compensation. The "practical equivalence," from the landowner's
point of view, of a "temporary" ban on all economic use is a forced

leasehold. 174
Whether or not Lucas is directly on point in temporary takings cases
is a question on which reasonable minds can differ. If the relevant parcel
of property is the temporal segment of property during the moratorium's
effective period, then Lucas would apply because there would be no
economically beneficial uses of the property. But Lucas itself did not
involve a temporary taking. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Lucas
does not apply to temporary regulations because finding a destruction of
all economically beneficial use necessarily requires severing the parcel
of property along its temporal dimension. 175 Even under this latter
theory, however, it is the remaining economically beneficial use of the
property, and not its remaining value, that should be decisive for the
taking inquiry. Thus, even if Lucas does not directly cover temporary
regulations, the reasoning in Lucas is at odds with the reasoning in
Tahoe-Sierra.
Loss in value plays a very different role in Penn Central from its
role in Lucas. The underlying difference between the two tests is the

173. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465.
174. See id. at 1492-93 (citations omitted); see also Steven J. Eagle, Just
Compensationfor Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 485, 502
(2001) (explaining that "temporary takings" may be understood in terms of taking
temporal interests, rather than temporary takings of a fee simple); Kmiec, The Original
Understanding,supra note 56, at 1655 ("The answer is no more complicated than the fact
that total takings, even those that last for a temporary period, are still total takings.").
175. See infra Part IV.B.
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degree to which they are concerned with the potential equivalence of
regulations to physical takings. Penn Central apparently looks to lost
value to determine whether the regulation's effect would be unfair
without compensation. 176 Lucas, on the other hand, looks to lost value to
determine if there are remaining economically beneficial uses of the
property, and, accordingly, whether the regulation is equivalent to a
physical appropriation.177 The Chief Justice's claim that the TahoeSierra regulation was the practical equivalent of a physical taking of a
leasehold highlights the fundamental difficulty with the Tahoe-Sierra
holding in this regard. 178 If a regulation amounts to a physical taking of a
leasehold (which is per se compensable), then a decision to apply Penn
Central's balancing test must be accompanied by an explanation of why
an otherwise compensable taking is different if it occurs via a regulatory
act.
The Tahoe-Sierra majority's outright rejection of practical
equivalence as a potentially decisive factor fails to provide this
explanation.
The Tahoe-Sierra Court attempted to refute the Chief Justice's
argument by noting that there is a difference between a temporary taking
of all economically beneficial uses and the appropriation of a leasehold
interest:
Of course, from both the landowner's and the government's
standpoint there are critical differences between a leasehold and
moratorium. Condemnation of a leasehold gives the government
possession of the property, the right to admit and exclude others, and
the right to use it for a public purpose. A regulatory taking, by
contrast, does not give the government any right to use the property,
nor does it dispossess the owner or affect her right to exclude
others. 179
This distinction, however, is a strange one to emphasize in an effort to
show the inapplicability of the Lucas principle, because the same
distinction between regulation and direct appropriation applied in Lucas
itself.' 80 A permanent destruction of all economically beneficial use, as
in Lucas, would likewise still permit a property owner to admit and
exclude others. In fact, even a permanent physical occupation might still
permit exclusion of most of the public;' 8' yet, compensation is mandated
176. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
177. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
178. See Tahoe-Sierra,122 S. Ct. at 1493 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1479 n.19.
180. See Huffman, supra note 23, at 603 n.46.
181. For example, if the government acquired an easement permitting passage across
an individual's property for certain purposes, see Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987), a property owner might still retain the ability to exclude individuals that
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in such situations. The question, as emphasized in Pumpelly, is whether
the government act has effectively 1dispossessed
the owner, despite
82
formal retention of title to the property.
The majority also suggested that the Chief Justice's dissent had
stretched the "physical equivalence" argument too far because "even a
regulation that constitutes only a minor infringement on property may,
from the landowner's perspective, be the functional equivalent of an
appropriation."' 83 This argument goes to the heart of Justice Holmes's
concern that "government could hardly go on" if every regulation of
property that diminished value was compensable.1 84 It is not at all clear
how a line can be drawn that easily separates minor infringements on
property from major ones if the practical equivalence argument is the
sole guide in this context. 85 The Chief Justice, as shall be seen,
looked
86
concern.'
this
answer
to
law
state
of
principles
background
to
Finally, the Tahoe-Sierramajority added that the rule in Lucas was
justified not only by reference to the equivalence between the regulation
and a physical taking, but also was justified by the fact that it would be
"less realistic to assume that the regulation will secure an 'average
reciprocity of advantage,' or that government could not go on if required
to pay for every such restriction."' 187 The Tahoe-Sierramajority felt that
these secondary justifications were not present for temporary regulations
and, accordingly, that there was less reason to apply a per se rule. 88 The
Tahoe-Sierra Court's rationale for these latter distinctions was far from
persuasive in light of the reasoning in Lucas and the alternative
do not meet the requirements of the easement taken. Similarly, in Lucas, there were
certainly worthwhile remaining uses of the property (such as hiking or bird watching),
but they were not rights sufficient to overcome the conclusion that the property had been
effectively taken. See 505 U.S. at 1015.
182. See Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
183. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479 n.19.
184. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
185. This is Justice Stevens's argument, dissenting in Lucas:
[T]he Court suggests that "total deprivation of feasible use is, from the
landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation." This
argument proves too much. From the "landowner's point of view," a regulation
that diminishes the lot's value by 50% is as well "the equivalent" of the
condemnation of half of the lot.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1066 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens's
concern is arguably accurate as to deprivations of fifty percent of the property's value,
but not as to very slight injuries to property. See Eagle, supra note 174, at 1655
(suggesting compensation inappropriate for de minimis injuries). Justice Stevens
recognized the implication of the practical equivalence theory in Lucas, but then cabined
that theory within the confines of the Lucas facts in his Tahoe-Sierra opinion. See
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1482-84.
186. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1490-96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1479 n.19.
188. Id.
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understanding set forth in the Chief Justice's dissent.
a.

Average Reciprocity ofAdvantage

"Average reciprocity of advantage" is not well defined in Supreme
Court jurisprudence, but covers those instances where the regulated
property owners are benefited as a result of the regulation of their
property such that compensation may not be required. 8 9 The doctrine
has justified determinations that a regulation did not result in a taking.' 90
It appears that the Court is willing to presume an average reciprocity of
advantage in temporary takings cases even though it rejected such a
presumption in cases like Lucas.
As Professor Richard A. Epstein has noted, however, it makes no
sense to presume an average reciprocity of advantage to property owners
in some regulatory taking cases but not in others, since there is no reason
to presume that the legislature would act to improve social welfare in
partial taking cases, but not in total taking cases. 19' If the Court rejects
189. The doctrine was briefly announced in Pennsylvania Coal, but without much
explanation of its underlying principles. 260 U.S. at 415. Average reciprocity of
advantage is often understood in terms of the extent to which the property owner has
been singled out to bear the burden of regulation that benefits society generally. For
discussion of this interpretation, see Huffman, supra note 23, at 608 ("[Average
reciprocity of advantage] is a concept that is directly responsive to the constitutional
objectives stated in Agins and First English. The idea is that some regulations impose
comparable costs and benefits on the same people, often the population in general, but
sometimes particular segments of the population."). See EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 19599. In some instances, the concept has been linked to statutes that prevent uses of
property that constitute nuisances. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). It has also been linked to general statutes that
broadly affect all property owners. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 147 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Even where the government prohibits a
non-injurious use, the Court has ruled that a taking does not take place if the prohibition
applies over a broad cross-section of land and thereby 'secure[s] an average reciprocity of
advantage.' It is for this reason that zoning does not constitute a taking. While zoning at
times reduces individual property values, the burden is shared relatively evenly and it is
reasonable to conclude that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of
the zoning will be benefited by another.") (citation omitted); see also Michelman, supra
note 12, at 1225.
190. See, e.g., Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 ("The Court's hesitance to find a taking
when the State merely restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances
is consistent with the notion of 'reciprocity of advantage' that Justice Holmes referred to
in Pennsylvania Coal."); cf Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987) ("Also weighing
weakly in favor of the statute is the fact that there is something of an 'average reciprocity
of advantage,' to the extent that owners of escheatable interests maintain a nexus to the
tribe. Consolidation of Indian lands in the Tribe benefits the members of the Tribe.")
(citation omitted).
191. Epstein, A Tangled Web, supra note 41, at 1374 ("The obvious rejoinder is to ask
why the Court should ever 'indulge' an assumption that this average reciprocity of
advantage will apply, in light of the enormous political pressures from both minority
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the presumption in the context of a total destruction of all economically
beneficial use, as it did in Lucas, it is difficult to see why it should
generally adopt such a presumption in the temporary taking context. The
Court, moreover, had already excepted "normal delays" that are part of
the permit process from its compensation holding in First English, and
they are the category of temporary regulations that fits well into an
average reciprocity of advantage analysis.1 92 Such delays are different in
in Tahoe-Sierra, which had no chance of
kind from the moratorium
193
resulting in a permit.
The Tahoe-Sierra majority held that with a temporary ban, as
opposed to a situation in which all economically beneficial use is
destroyed, there is less chance that individuals are singled out to bear
burdens that should be shared by the public as a whole. 194 The majority
stated that "[a]t least with a moratorium there is a clear 'reciprocity of
advantage,' because it protects the interests of all affected landowners
against immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the
provisions of the plan that is ultimately adopted."' 195 Although this
consequence might be a benefit to property owners in some cases, the
existence of a potential benefit does not therefore mean that property was
not taken. It is unclear how the Court calculated that a landowner who
cannot build for three years is less likely to be singled out to bear a
burden that should be shared by the public, simply because other
landowners also cannot build. 196 In the case of a physical taking of a
leasehold, there presumably would still be a taking even if other owners
had their leaseholds appropriated.

factions and determined majorities that so often lead legislatures astray. To the extent
that there is average reciprocity of advantage in a given statute, there is greater reason to
believe that the legislation will produce improvements in overall social welfare. Even so,
the average reciprocity of advantage should be established by the evidence, rather than
presumed as a matter of law. Why assume that partial restrictions are motivated by high
public purpose but that total restrictions are not?").
192. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
193. Cf United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985)
("A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or
her property does not itself 'take' the property in any sense: after all, the very existence
of a permit system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to
use the property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other
viable uses available to the owner.").
194. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1488 (2002).
195. Id. at 1489 (citation omitted).
196. Even in the Lucas context, this type of benefit would theoretically exist-land
speculators might buy properties with no economically beneficial use, and would receive
the benefit resulting from other landowners not building, if the regulation were ever
rescinded.
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The Tahoe-Sierra Court then quoted its decision in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis 97 for the proposition that,
"[w]hile each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, ' in
98
turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others."'
This language is out of place in Tahoe-Sierra,however. The reference to
"such restrictions" in Keystone referred originally to restrictions that
restrain uses that are "tantamount to public nuisances," and are part of an
implied obligation of the property owner not to injure the community. 199
If indeed the Court meant to extend this broad concept of reciprocity to
all contexts, then it is hard to imagine a case not subject to Penn Central
balancing. 200 Even a total taking under Lucas could produce benefits of
this type.20'
If an average reciprocity of advantage is understood simply to
describe those cases where an arguable benefit to the property owner
results from the regulation,20 2 such implicit compensation should go to
the amount of compensation due as a result of a taking, and not to the
question of whether a taking occurred in the first place. After all, the
reciprocal benefit might not remotely equal the damages due from the
taking, as the reciprocity of advantage could be quite small in value
relative to what was lost.20 3 This concern does not support a Penn
Central analysis to determine whether a taking occurred, but rather
197. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
198. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
199. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 (describing benefits that result from restrictions
on uses that are tantamount to public uses as consistent with the concept of average
reciprocity of advantage).
200. Cf Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing for reciprocity of advantage where a regulation is part of "the advantage of
living and doing business in a civilized community"). As Professor Epstein has
explained, the mere generality of a regulation in no way indicates that an average
reciprocity of advantage exists. See Richard A. Epstein, The Seven Deadly Sins of
Takings Law: The Dissents in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 26 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 955, 969 (1993) (stating that average reciprocity of advantage exists where general
regulation provides the same benefits to all those regulated).
201. The Lucas Court, however, declined such a presumption and, moreover,
expressed doubt that the generality of a regulation should be dispositive. Cf Lucas v.
S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.14 (1992) ("[A] regulation specifically
directed to land use no more acquires immunity by plundering landowners generally than
does a law specifically directed at religious practice acquire immunity by prohibiting all
religions. Justice Stevens's approach renders the Takings Clause little more than a
particularized restatement of the Equal Protection Clause.").
202. See EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 195-99 (describing average reciprocity of
advantage as "implicit in kind" compensation).
203. See Huffman, supra note 23, at 609 ("If a particular regulation results in a taking
when there are no reciprocal benefits, it makes no sense to conclude that there is not a
taking when reciprocal benefits exist. It does make sense to acknowledge that in both
instances there is a taking, but in the latter there is compensation. What remains is to
determine only whether the compensation is just.").
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supports a careful review of harm during the damages phase of a trial.
b.

The Implied Limitation Doctrine

The Tahoe-Sierra Court also distinguished Lucas in light of the
Lucas Court's claim that compensation under the per se rule would only
be required in rare cases. 20 4 The Tahoe-Sierra Court argued that a
categorical rule was appropriate in Lucas but not elsewhere because of
the allegedly high costs of applying a categorical rule in other
contexts. 20 5 This theme runs throughout Tahoe-Sierra. The potential
cost of just compensation to regulators is a fear that pervades the
opinion. 206
The Chief Justice's dissent responded to this concern with a
refinement of the Lucas holding that limited the contexts in which the per
se rule would apply to temporary regulations.20 7 In Pennsylvania Coal,
the Court recognized that property rights "are enjoyed under an implied
limitation." 20 8 Certain regulations are not a taking because the property
rights at issue were not an attribute of ownership prior to the
regulation. 20 9 The same principle was an important aspect of the Lucas
holding. As the Chief Justice noted in his Tahoe-Sierradissent:
[I]n Lucas, after holding that the regulation prohibiting all
economically beneficial use of the coastal land came within our
categorical takings rule, we nonetheless inquired into whether such a
result "inhered in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's
law of property and nuisance already place
2 10
upon land ownership."

The Chief Justice argued that normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances, and variances were also "a
longstanding feature of state property law 2and part of a landowner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations." 11
204. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465,
1484 (2002).
205. Id. at 1487.
206. In particular, see the Court's discussion at the conclusion of the Tahoe-Sierra
opinion. 122 S. Ct. at 1486-89.
207. Id.at 1490-96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
208. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long recognized some
values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.").
209. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) ("Where the
State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we
think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with.").
210. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S.Ct. at 1494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
211. Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029).
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According to the Chief Justice's dissent, courts must determine
whether a moratorium on development, which would otherwise be a
categorical taking, is nonetheless consistent with an implied limitation
under background principles of state property law.2 12 The typical
moratorium does not implicate Lucas because it does not deprive
landowners of all economically beneficial use of their land.2 13 Usually,
moratoria prohibit only a specific use.214 As the dissent reasoned,
moratoria that prohibit all development do not have a long historical
lineage, and "thus it is less certain that property is acquired under
215 the
'implied limitation' of a moratorium prohibiting all development."
However, the Chief Justice argued that it was not necessary in the
Tahoe-Sierra context to address moratoria generally, because the
duration of the moratorium in that case "far exceed[ed] that of ordinary
moratoria. '' 21 6 For example, unlike the typical moratorium in California,
which is statutorily capped at forty-five days, 217 the moratorium at issue
in Tahoe-Sierra arguably lasted six years. 218 Accordingly,
the Chief
219
Justice would have held that just compensation was due.
The Tahoe-Sierra majority did not take this argument seriously. In
a footnote, the Court grouped the dissent's theory of the case with other
proposed and rejected categorical rules:
The Chief Justice offers another alternative, suggesting that delays of
six years or more should be treated as per se takings. However his
dissent offers no explanation for why 6 years should be the cut-off

point rather than 10 days, 10 months, or 10 years.

It is worth

212. See id. at 1494-95 (noting that, "[w]hen a regulation merely delays a final land
use decision, we have recognized that there are other background principles of state
property law that prevent the delay from being deemed a taking" and that "the short-term
delays attendant to zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of state property
law and part of a landowner's reasonable investment-backed expectations").
213. Id. at 1495.
214. See id. (citing examples of moratoria that limit one specific use of property).
215. Id. The argument was not directed at the Lucas per se rule, but, instead, at the
"background principles of state law" aspect of Lucas.
216. Id. This suggestion that the amount of time an implied limitation has been in
place could be decisive (its "lineage") is worth comparing to the theory in Palazzolo that
a mere post-enactment transfer of property will not suffice to establish a statute as a
background principle of state law. See infra notes 246-75 and accompanying text. It is
not clear how the novelty of a particular regulatory action is relevant to whether it is a
background principle of state law, so long as the regulation was in place prior to the
landowner's acquisition of the property.
217. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65858(a) (West Supp. 2002).
218. See Tahoe-Sierra,122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The majority
determined that the Chief Justice's conclusion that the moratorium lasted six years
required analysis of issues not before the Court on the grant of certiorari. Id. at 1474 n.8.
This disagreement is not relevant for purposes of this article.
219. Id. at 1496 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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emphasizing that we do not reject a categorical rule in this case
because a 32-month moratorium is just not that harsh. Instead, we
reject a categorical rule because we conclude that the Penn Central
framework adequately directs the inquiry to the p roper
considerations--only one of which is the length of the delay.
The Court fundamentally misunderstood the Chief Justice's
argument. Certainly a six-year rule would have been an arbitrary cut-off,
had one been proposed. But the Chief Justice emphasized that he was
not proposing a six-year rule, 22 1 and a fair reading of his argument hardly
implies such a proposal. There were indeed proposals for caps beyond
which a moratorium would be a categorical taking, 222 but the dissent did
not include such a proposal. 3 What the dissent proposed was an
exception, possibly quite broad, to a categorical rule-an exception for
temporary regulations that are consistent with background principles of
state law. 224 A six-year moratorium would not fall under this exception.
The benefits to be found in the Chief Justice's proposal are many.
For one thing, the determination of whether an implied limitation inheres
in a background principle of state property law calls for an objective,
relatively predictable inquiry. 225 Background principles are capable of
illumination by both property owners and regulators, as well as courts.
Such principles eliminate originalism concerns by allowing for a parallel
between compensation for regulatory takings and direct, physical
takings-the practical equivalence doctrine. Both the narrow and broad
readings of the original intent should permit compensation in this
context.
Moreover, background principles of state law provide a
substantial limit on the reach of the just compensation requirement,
limiting fears that every regulation that diminishes "to some extent the
226
values incident to property" will require compensation.

220. Id. at 1487 n.34.
221. See id. at 1495 n.4 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Six years is not a 'cut-off
point'; it is the length involved in this case. And the 'explanation' for the conclusion that
there is a taking in this case is the fact that a 6-year moratorium far exceeds any
moratorium authorized under background principles of state property law.").
222. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Institute for Justice in Support of
Petitioners at 30, Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (No. 00-1167) (proposing a one-year cutoff).
223. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1490-96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
224. Id.
225. Cf Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces into the Takings
Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 1025 (1997) ("Suggestions in case and
commentary that the landowner should assume the burden of regulatory risk stand
fundamentally in contradistinction to the Court's reattachment of takings jurisprudence in
Lucas, Nollan, and Dolan to the objective reality of the background principles of state
property law.") [hereinafter Kmiec, Last Remaining Pieces].
226. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922).
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The dissenting argument, however, is also a challenge to the
explanation of the implied limitation doctrine set forth in Lucas.227 The
Lucas formulation tracked protections against nuisances and safety
regulations.22 8 The Lucas Court also appeared to preclude compensation
where the government action tracked a "pre-existing limitation on the
landowner's title. 2 29 The relevant issue was what sticks of property
remained in the bundle. Treating permit requirements and the like as
implied limitations on property rights, as the Chief Justice proposes,
extends the doctrine beyond "what could have been achieved in the
23 0
A zoning regulation frequently does not implicate the state's
courts.,,
power to abate nuisances, or to "forestall other grave threats to the lives
and property of others." 23' This is not a situation, as outlined in Lucas,
where the state may "identify background principles of nuisance and
intends in
property law that prohibit the uses [the property owner] now
232
the circumstances in which the property is presently found.1
Zoning regulations, as the Chief Justice noted, did exist in the
colonial era.233 They are without question a longstanding feature of state
property law. It does not follow that property owners lack property
227. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1494-95 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
228. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
229. Id. at 1028-29. This theory is elaborated in Barros, supra note 46, at 1872 n. 100.
See also Kmiec, Last Remaining Pieces, supra note 225, at 1024 n.143. This aspect of
Lucas is discussed more fully in the Palazzolo context. See infra notes 242-71 and
accompanying text.
230. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
231. See id. at 1029 n.16.
232. See id. at 1031.
233. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1494 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice may have been
suggesting that the Takings Clause did not extend to these delays because the Takings
Clause was presumably enacted without the intent of disturbing such colonial zoning
regulations. This is a difficult question. A just compensation clause was not proposed by
any of the state ratifying conventions, see Treanor, Takings Clause, supranote 34, at 834,
but appears to be Madison's own contribution. Professor Akhil Reed Amar has argued
that Madison sought ratification of the Takings Clause without substantial support for it
by bundling it with other clauses of the Fifth Amendment. See Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1181-82 (1991). Furthermore, the
Takings Clause was intended to apply to the federal government, and not to the states.
Thus states may not have been concerned by a broad reading of the text because their
own regulations were not implicated. See Gold, supra note 50, at 226-27 ("[T]he scope
of the Takings Clause in terms of regulatory acts must follow from the intent of the
Framers of the Fifth Amendment, who thought they would limit only the federal
government."); Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case
Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and ConstitutionalStructure, 76
CAL. L. REV. 267, 268 (1988) (discussing founding intent to apply Takings Clause at
federal level). As a result of the lack of discussion of the Takings Clause pre-ratification,
it is hard to say whether the Takings Clause was intended to address colonial legislative
excesses, or whether the typical colonial regulation of property was assumed to be safe
under the new just compensation clause.
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rights in the first place with respect to the incidents of zoning
regulation.234 The dissent subtly alters the calculus so that the court may
identify background principles through the types of regulation that
property owners would expect.235 This perspective is different from
looking to nuisance-type principles that already prohibit the use that is
The result is not a minor change in doctrine.
being regulated.
Admittedly, the dissent appears to draw a line between its expectationsbased theory in the temporary takings context and the nuisance-based
theory in the permanent takings context, 236 perhaps recognizing that its
reasoning would limit the holding in Lucas. But the suggestion that
temporary takings are somehow different from permanent takings runs
against the tenor of the dissenting argument, and is moreover arbitrary.
In comparison to the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion offers
a great deal. By adopting this standard, it would be possible for the
Court to avoid a Takings Clause that it might consider overbroad--one
that regularly applies to the zoning process-while at the same time
applying objective, categorical rules to determine if property was taken.
This theory, however, is not truly an "implied limitation" theory, as it
does not depend on the idea that prior law impliedly limited the property
rights at issue so that they could not have been exercised at the time they
were allegedly taken. Instead, it is an expectations-based theory--one
that was proposed by Justice Kennedy in his Lucas concurrence.237
Indeed, the dissent points to expectations (and Justice Kennedy's
concurrence) in justifying its new gloss on Lucas.238
234. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (overturning a zoning
classification because it did not advance a legitimate governmental purpose).
235. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1490-96 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
236. See id. at 1494 ("When a regulation merely delays a final land use decision, we
have recognized that there are other background principles of state property law that
prevent the delay from being deemed a taking."). This language suggests that the Chief
Justice's broad understanding of background principles of state property law in TahoeSierra may be limited to the zoning delay context, and that the stricter Lucas
requirements would apply to other partial taking cases.
237. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
proposed the following test:
The finding of no value must be considered under the Takings Clause by
reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations.... The
rights conferred by the Takings Clause and the police power of the State may
coexist without conflict. Property is bought and sold, investments are made,
subject to the State's power to regulate. Where a taking is alleged from
regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test must be whether the
deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expectations.
Id. (citations omitted).
238. See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1495 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Thus, the
short-term delays attendant to zoning and permit regimes are a longstanding feature of
state property law and part of a landowner's reasonable investment-backed
expectations.") (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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Since the Chief Justice's dissent might become the law as far as
interpreting the "implied limitation" doctrine (presumably at least Justice
Kennedy agrees with the three dissenting Justices in this regard), it is
worth noting the weaknesses of the new interpretation. Given the
propensity of courts to find that there is no regulatory taking under Penn
Central, an expectations-based "implied limitation" doctrine, combined
with a regularly applied Penn Central analysis, could constitute a oneway ratchet. 239 The open-ended, and possibly expanding, restrictions of
property owners' expectations might defeat the property-defined
standard, which most recommends the implied limitation doctrine as set
forth in Lucas. Unless the types of regulations that constitute potential
background principles are susceptible to a bright-line rule, this is a
potentially limitless loophole in the Takings Clause and may represent
one more respect in which regulatory takings differ from physical
takings. Perhaps a limiting rule could be found in the dissent's reference
Limitations on property rights that were
to colonial practices. 240
arguably assumed to go uncompensated by the state ratifying
conventions might justify an expectations theory on originalism grounds,
and would cabin the otherwise expansive role for expectations as a
restriction of property rights.
The better path in Tahoe-Sierra would have been a distinct
exception to the Lucas per se rule in the temporary taking context for
regulations that comprise normal delays of the permit process. This
result could be reached without reliance on the implied limitation
doctrine. The Court had already excepted such regulations from its
239. This concern was recognized to some degree by Justice Kennedy in his Lucas
concurrence:
There is an inherent tendency towards circularity in this synthesis, of course;
for if the owner's reasonable expectations are shaped by what courts allow as a
proper exercise of governmental authority, property tends to become what
courts say it is. Some circularity must be tolerated in these matter, however, as
it is in other spheres. The definition, moreover, is not circular in its entirety.
The expectations protected by the Constitution are based on objective rules and
customs that can be understood as reasonable by all parties involved.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1034-35 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted). In fact, the ad
hoc nature of Penn Central accentuates this danger, as it may be less than clear whether
courts that deny compensation under that test were swayed by an "objective rule" or
some more subjective element of the balancing test. At least under a Lucas analysis, it
would be possible to identify precisely whether an implied limitation was decisive. It'is
worth noting, however, that Justice Kennedy clearly thought there were constitutional
limits to what is considered a "reasonable expectation" in this context. Justice Kennedy
thought that promotion of tourism, for example, could not qualify as the source of an
concurring); see
implied limitation under his understanding. See id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J.,
also Kmiec, Last Remaining Pieces, supra note 225, at 1016. Justice Kennedy would
apply a means-end test under his analysis. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1035-36 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
240. See Tahoe-Sierra. 122 S. Ct. at 1494 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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holding in FirstEnglish and, moreover, there is a better argument in that
context for recognizing an average reciprocity of advantage-brief
delays prior to the receipt of a development permit provide a generalized
benefit to all property owners (such as the prevention of nuisances), and
cause only a limited injury. The injuries from such delays, theoretically,
are de minimis.241 This type of reasoning would leave intact the
conceptual underpinnings of the implied limitation doctrine in Lucas.
In fact, the clarity of the implied limitation doctrine is already
fading. Another recent decision, Palazzolo, suggests the Court is well on
its way to discarding the Lucas understanding of background principles
of state property law.242 In Lucas, the Court explained that its takings
jurisprudence "has traditionally been guided by the understandings of our
citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle
2 43
of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property.5
Palazzolo suggests this principle is no longer guiding the Court.244
Moreover, the majority opinion in Palazzolo was joined by Justices that
were part of the Lucas majority.
In Palazzolo, the Court rejected a categorical rule that appeared to
flow naturally from principles of ownership recognized in the physical or
direct taking context. 245 The petitioner (Palazzolo) owned a property that
he sought to develop, but his applications were denied by the relevant
state agencies. 246 However, the regulation that supported the denial of
his application had been enacted prior to Palazzolo's ownership.24 7 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that there could be no taking
(under either Lucas or Penn Central), because the regulation at issue
predated the acquisition of the property. 248 The Court's theory was that
the right was not possessed by the new property owner in consequence of
249
the pre-transfer regulation.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.

It concluded that a

241. Professor Steven J. Eagle has argued that such delays are consistent with "the
requirement that a permanent physical occupation must be more than transitory, or that
injunctive relief in nuisance cases requires more than de minimis injury." Eagle, supra
note 174, at 500. This theory would bring the implied limitation in the temporary
regulatory taking context in line with the holdings in the physical taking context.
242. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
243. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
244. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630 ("A law does not become a background principle
for subsequent owners by enactment itself.").
245. See id. at 614-30.
246. Id.at 614-16 (describing various unsuccessful permit applications to develop the
property).
247. See id. at 614-15 (describing a 1978 passage of title from corporation to
petitioner, subsequent to enactment of state environmental legislation).
248. Id. at 616.
249. Id.
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categorical "notice" rule could have unfair consequences:
Were we to accept the State's rule, the postenactment transfer of title
would absolve the State of its obligation to defend any action
restricting land use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable. A State
would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings
Clause. This ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too,' have a
right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and value of
land. °
The Palazzolo Court further looked to language in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission251 for support. In Nollan, the Court addressed a
state regulatory agency's requirement that oceanfront landowners
provide beach access to the public as a condition for a development
permit. 52 The petitioners in Nollan purchased their property after the
regulation went into effect.2 53 However, the Nollan Court rejected a
notice rule, reasoning that, "[s]o long as the Commission could not have
deprived the prior owners of the easement without compensating them,
the prior owners must be understood
to have transferred their full
254
property rights in conveying the lot.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Palazzolo, recognized that the
majority's holding was not consistent with a treatment of regulatory
takings as practical equivalents of physical takings. 5 As he noted, in
takings jurisprudence, it is blackletter law that it is "the person who
owned the property at the time of the taking that is entitled to the
recovery. '256 The Court's rule allowed for exceptions in the regulatory
takings context. Justice Stevens further argued that the Nollan precedent
was not on point, as the event that constituted a taking in that case
"occurred after the petitioners had become the owner of the property and
250. Id. at 627. It is difficult to see how this "expiration date" argument would not
also apply in cases where physical takings are at issue. Although it may be much easier
to bring a claim for a physical taking, ultimately a buyer of a piece of property postphysical taking could also allege that the transfer of property worked as an expiration
date for the Takings Clause as well.
251. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
252. Id. at 828-29.
253. Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 833 n.2.
255. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 639 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court argues
that a regulatory taking is different from a direct state appropriation of property and that
the rules this Court has developed for identifying the time of the latter do not apply to the
former. This is something of an odd conclusion, in that the entire rationale for allowing
compensation for regulations in the first place is the somewhat dubious proposition that
some regulations go so 'far' as to become the functional equivalent of a direct taking.").
256. See id. at 639 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308
U.S. 271, 284 (1939)) ("For the reason that compensation is due at the time of taking, the
owner at that time, not the owner at an earlier or later date, receives the payment.").
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,9257
unquestionably diminished the value of petitioners' property.
The Palazzolo majority explicitly distinguished regulatory takings
from physical takings.258 The Court noted that, unlike the physical
takings context, regulatory takings are subject to unique prudential
ripeness requirements.2 5 9 As a result of these principles, which can delay
cases for many years, "[i]t would be illogical, and unfair, to bar a
regulatory takings claim because of the post-enactment transfer of
ownership where the steps necessary to make the claim ripe were not
taken, or could not have been taken, by a previous owner." 260 In light of
its ripeness holdings, the Court chose a special rule for post-enactment
transfers.2 6'
The Court was also quick to distinguish Lucas's rule that
regulations consistent with background principles of state law are not
ncmn might be a
Wtotcaiyn
clarifying when a legislative enactment
takings. 262 Without
background principle of state property law, the Court concluded that a
law does not become a background principle "by enactment itself., 263 In

257. Id. at 642-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("That [taking]-a compelled transfer of
an interest in property-occurred after the petitioners had become the owner of the
property and unquestionably diminished the value of petitioners' property. Even though
they had notice when they bought the property that such a taking might occur, they never
contended that any action taken by the State before their purchase gave rise to any right
to compensation."). Justice Stevens is not entirely consistent, however. In a footnote
thereafter, he adds that a pre-taking event can play a role in precluding a taking. See id.
at 643 n.6 ("In cases such as Nollan-in which landowners have notice of a regulation
when they purchase a piece of property but the regulatory event constituting the taking
does not occur until after they take title to the property-I would treat the owners' notice
as relevant to the evaluation of whether the regulation goes 'too far,' but not necessarily
dispositive.") (citing Justice O'Connor's Palazzolo concurrence).
258. Id. at 628.
259. Id. at 618-26. Under the test established in Williamson County Regional
Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), a plaintiff must establish a
final state decision and denial of just compensation when bringing an "as applied"
challenge in federal court. Even a denial of a land-use permit is not necessarily final.
See id. The entities responsible for granting permits frequently deny a permit but allow a
more narrow application to be brought, thus postponing "ripeness" under the Court's
precedent. Although these ripeness requirements are arguably "prudential," see Suitum
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733 (1997), they also frequently preclude
federal courts from hearing takings claims for many years. See Eagle, supra note 1, at
977-78 ("Under 'prudential ripeness principles,' which the Court devised for application
to regulatory takings claims and to no others, landowners must overcome a complex and
difficult set of hurdles in order to obtain federal court review. Claims often will not be
heard at all. The adjudication of conceptually straightforward regulatory takings claims
may take a decade or longer.").
260. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628.
261. Id. at 629-30.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 630. In contrast, Professor Daniel R. Mandelker has argued that Justice
Scalia's Lucas opinion understood recently enacted land-use regulations to limit the just
compensation rights of post-enactment property owners. See Daniel R. Mandelker,
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so holding, it implicitly limited the extent to which states define state
property rights for Takings Clause purposes. The Palazzolo majority
concluded that a rule barring compensation based on post-enactment
transfers would create a "relative standard, ' '264 one that allegedly would
be inconsistent with the Lucas analysis, which looks to "common, shared
understandings of permissible limitations derived from a State's legal
tradition." 265 As the Court explained: "A regulation or common-law rule
cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for others. 266
The problem with this analysis, however, is that it actually "freezes"
state law (unlike the rule in Lucas, which has mistakenly been accused of
this effect).26 7 There is a world of difference between state changes in
property law that seek to alter retroactively the legal effect of prior
background principles of state law, and state changes in property law that
have prospective effect. It is the former that were implicated in Lucas,
and that implicate the principle that a "State, by ipse dixit, may not
transform
private
property
into
public
property
without
compensation. '268 In contrast, a determination that prospective state
property law that predates the alleged taking is not a relevant background
principle necessarily ignores the evolution of state property law.
The Palazzolo majority responded to this issue, conceding that
"[p]roperty rights are created by the State., 269 The majority's suggestion
that a "relative standard" would result from deferring to state definitions
does not adequately address the problem, however, especially under the
balancing test suggested in Justice O'Connor's concurrence.2 7 °
Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995). The author
believes that the opinion is ambiguous on this question, as Justice Scalia's dictum in that
case can also be read narrowly to address post-enactment acquisitions where the
regulation is consistent with state nuisance law. The language is much broader respecting
regulations of personal property. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1027-28 (1992); see also Kmiec, Last Remaining Pieces, supra note 225, at 1002 n.33
(suggesting background principles of state law "may be subject to statutory modifications
that refine or sharpen nuisance-like considerations").
264. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 630.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. But cf Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1068-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The Court's
holding today effectively freezes the common law, denying the legislature much of its
traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."). In
Palazzolo the state was prevented from revising the bundle of rights for future owners
without exposing itself to liability, insofar as the Court's Penn Central test might find a
taking of future owners' rights based on investment-backed expectations. See Palazzolo,
533 U.S. at 629-30.
268. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
269. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
270. Under Justice Scalia's concurrence, it is at least clear that the encroachment on
state definitions of property rights will occur in a specific instance-all occasions where
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Palazzolo suggests that takings property in the regulatory context is an
inherently nebulous concept that property rights established by state law
are subject to reworking via federal common law.27 1
Palazzolo is a harbinger of future revisions to the "implied
limitation" doctrine. When read in combination with the Chief Justice's
Tahoe-Sierra dissent, it appears that Justice Kennedy's understanding in
his Lucas concurrence will prevail. The resultant blurring of the implied
limitation doctrine may benefit regulators in some cases, and property
owners in other cases such as Palazzolo, but it is difficult to square the
evolving doctrine with a consistent theory of regulatory takings.
B.

The Reaffirmation of the "Parcelas a Whole" Doctrine

The "parcel as a whole" doctrine reflects a longstanding distinction
between regulatory and physical takings. Theories of just compensation
that are concerned with the economic impact of regulations on property,
including both Penn Central and Lucas, depend heavily on the court's
determination of what property is at issue. While the property at issue is
relatively obvious to courts for physical takings, the determination of the
"relevant parcel" of property has been controversial in the regulatory
takings context. The "parcel as a whole" doctrine precludes dividing the
relevant parcel of property (whatever it may be) into smaller pieces when
analyzing the economic impact of a regulation. The distinction between
finding the relevant parcel and dividing it, however, is highly subjective.
the prospective regulation of property would have worked a taking but for the postenactment transfer of property. Justice O'Connor's proposal, which is probably now the
law, would permit a relative standard-that is, the property owner's rights would vary
depending on the balancing test. See id. at 632-36 (O'Conner J., concurring).
271. Cf United States v. Craft, 122 S. Ct. 1414, 1432 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("Just as I am unwilling to overturn this Court's longstanding precedent that States define
and create property rights and forms of ownership, I am equally unwilling to redefine or
dismiss as fictional forms of property ownership that the State has recognized in favor of
an amorphous federal common-law definition of property.") (citation omitted). For an
interesting discussion of the degree to which the Court defers to state definition of
property rights in the takings context, see Merrill, supra note 46, at 897. See also Kmiec,
The Original Understanding,supra note 56, at 1642-44 (suggesting that some members
of the Court may recognize a constitutionally mandated minimum definition of property).
Palazzolo can arguably be seen as setting forth a limitation on state definitions of
property in order to protect property as understood in constitutional terms. Cf Merrill,
supra note 46 (proposing federal "patterning" definition of constitutional property). It is
hard to figure out exactly what the constitutional understanding of property would be in
the Palazzolo context, however. A better case for such reasoning could be made in the
context of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), which held
that longstanding background principles of state property law did not permit the
regulation at issue because the regulation conflicted with the long-recognized state
common law understanding that interest follows principle. Id. In that case, a particular
state common law rule was apparently constitutionalized, inasmuch as conflicting state
law was ignored by the Court.
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Justice Thomas's dissent, joined by Justice Scalia, questioned the
Tahoe-SierraCourt's reaffirmation of the "parcel as a whole" doctrine,
noting that First English rejected the idea that courts should consider
land in terms of its infinite life. 272 Where the Tahoe-Sierramajority saw
the relevant parcel as the land over the course of its existence, the
dissenting Justices saw the relevant parcel as the "temporal slice" of
property affected by the regulation.2 73
The difficulty in defining the relevant parcel of property, known as
the "denominator problem," is inherent in the divisibility of property.2 74
When calculating the economic impact of a regulation, courts must
compare the loss of value to the affected property against the original
value of that property-the "denominator" constitutes the original value
of the property at issue. By engaging in "conceptual severance"considering only part of the bundle of rights owned-a court can
interpret the regulation of property so that property was taken. 275 By
engaging in "conceptual agglomeration,, 276 a court can also achieve the
272. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1496 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("While this questionable rule has been
applied to various alleged regulatory takings, it was in my view, rejected in the context of
temporal deprivations of property .... I had thought that First English put to rest the
notion that the 'relevant denominator' is land's infinite life.").
273. See id. at 1496-97 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
274. Property may be divided along its spatial, functional, or temporal dimensions.
See Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the DenominatorProblem, 27 RUTGERS L.J.
663, 696-706 (1996) (discussing cases that address the severance of property into spatial
segments (both vertically and horizontally), severance into functional uses, and severance
into temporal segments). This "whole parcel" rule is itself a substantial distinction
between regulatory and physical takings, even in the context of rules that look to practical
equivalence, as in Lucas. As Justice Scalia noted in that case:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make
clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured.
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural
tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as
one in which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of
the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a
mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992). Justice Scalia suggested
that the owner's reasonable expectations might answer the question. See id.
275. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents
in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1684 (1988) (coining the
phrase "conceptual severance" for instances where courts do not consider the parcel as a
whole). For a good overview of the different ways in which courts engage in conceptual
severance, see Lisker, supra note 274.
276. See STEVEN EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS § 8-2(h) (1996). A notable example
is the Keystone Bituminous Coal decision, which applied this rule to deny compensation
in a case nearly identical to Pennsylvania Coal because the property owner still owned a
substantial quantity of coal that could be mined. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 507 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (finding the
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opposite result, adding unaffected property to the denominator that is not
properly considered by the court. The -Supreme Court has often held that
only the entire parcel of property may be considered, but it has never
provided a clear rule for determining the confines of the entire parcel.2 77
Even Lucas, with its categorical rules, ran into trouble in resolving
the denominator problem and left the issue unresolved.27 8 It cannot be
clear whether "all economically beneficial use" of property has been
destroyed if it is not clear what the relevant parcel of property is. 2 79 In
Palazzolo, the majority expressed doubt as to whether the Court's
"parcel as a whole" doctrine had merit. 280 This dictum, in a case where
the issue was not properly raised, suggested a willingness to reconsider
one of the more troublesome and subjective distinctions between
physical and regulatory takings. One year later, the Tahoe-Sierra Court
(including two Justices in the Palazzolo majority,28Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor) rejected severance without discussion. 1
In one sense, the Tahoe-Sierra Court's holding was necessary if it
wished to shore the Penn Central test. The Lucas analysis could readily
predominate if plaintiffs or courts are permitted to consider takings cases
by means of conceptual severance. 282 However, the Court's refusal to
permit conceptual severance is very hard to square with the Court's
strongly worded statement in the physical takings context that the
Takings Clause applies with no less power to pieces of property than it

Keystone facts to be essentially the same as in Pennsylvania Coal); Kmiec, The Original
Understanding, supra note 56, at 1631 ("As a matter of good faith interpretation,
Keystone is surely revisionist."); Michelman, supra note 12, at 1600 n.2 (describing the
Keystone opinion as an "amazing reconstruction"). A more excessive example is the
New York Court of Appeals ruling in the Penn Central case, which would determine
diminution in value based on the property owner's holdings in the vicinity of the
regulated property. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 42 N.Y.2d 324,
333-34 (1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7
(describing the New York court's holding as "extreme" and "unsupportable.").
277. See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborors Pension Trust
for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Keystone, 480 U.S. 470; Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51
(1979).
278. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
279. See id. at 1054 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The 'composition of the denominator
in our deprivation fraction,' is the dispositive inquiry. Yet there is no 'objective' way to
define what that denominator should be.") (citations omitted).
280. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) ("Some of our cases
indicate that the extent of deprivation effected by a regulatory action is measured against
the value of the parcel as a whole; but we have at times expressed discomfort with the
logic of this rule, a sentiment echoed by some commentators. Whatever the merits of
these criticisms, we will not explore the point here.") (citations omitted).
281. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1483 (2002) ("We have consistently rejected [a conceptual severance] approach to
the denominator question.").
282. This consequence was noted by the Tahoe-Sierra majority. See id.
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283

It seems strange to try to decide if a
does to property in its entirety.
regulation took a part of a larger property by examining the economic
impact of the regulation on the larger parcel, and the Court has already
recognized that regulations can "take" part of the bundle of property
rights.
Commentators have proposed a broad spectrum of suitable cases for
severance, ranging all the way to Professor Epstein's proposal that the
"protean forms of regulation all amount to partial takings of private
property. 2 84 Other theories would sever the parcel based on common
law-grounded investment-backed expectations, 285 state-recognized
commercial units of property,286 fundamental property rights,287 primary
intended uses of the property,288 or existence of a right of use. unique to a
segment of property identified by the property owner.289 Chief Justice
283. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436
(1982) ("[C]onstitutional protection for the rights of private property cannot be made to
depend on the size of the area permanently occupied."); see also Douglas W. Kmiec, At
Last, the Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147
(1995). Douglas W. Kmiec argues that the Penn Central anti-severance rule cannot be
squared with the common law divisibility of property, and that Lucas, Loretto, Nollan,
and Dolan are in tension with Penn Central in light of their reference to common law
understandings of property. Id. at 157.
284. See EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 101.
285. See Kmiec, Last Remaining Pieces, supra note 225, at 1011-23. Kmiec would
look to whether an individual had reasonable investment-backed expectations with regard
to a segment of the property in light of the totality of state property law at the time of
investment. It is crucial under his theory whether the use of the land is causally linked to
the harm that the regulation seeks to remedy. Id;; cf. Pennel v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S.
1, 15-24 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Since the owner's
use of the property is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the source of the social
problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly.").
286. See EAGLE, supra note 276, at 343 ("The commercial unit allows for the 'partial'
taking without allowing the property owner the possibility to custom-tailor as the
requisite bundle of rights that constituted the property exactly what the government
diminished.").
287. See David C. Buck, Note, "Property" in the Fifth Amendment: A Quest for
Common Ground in the Maze of Regulatory Takings, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1283, 1313
(1993) ("A categorical compensation requirement for the destruction of specified
elements of an owner's land would provide greater certainty to takings analysis. A
narrow delineation of protected property interests would identify a finite set of situations
in which courts, planners, and regulators would have to consider seriously objective
factors of adequate compensation.").
288. See Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cf
Mandelker, supra note 263, at 217.
289. See John E. Fee, Comment, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking
Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1556 (1994) ("Through reliance on the subjective
criteria of ownership and actual or intended use, courts have gone astray. The regulatory
taking inquiry should instead focus on whether the property interest proposed to have
been taken is in fact substantial enough to warrant Fifth Amendment protection as an
independent bundle of rights. Although different methods of measuring the substantiality
of a property interest could be devised, it seems that the most logical method would
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Rehnquist, dissenting in the Keystone case, proposed a form of severance
based on the destruction of all use of an identifiable segment of
property.29 °

This variety of severance options could enable courts to find a
severance rule that would not mandate compensation every time a
Without discussion (beyond a quick
regulation affects property.
recitation of precedents affirming the "parcel as a whole" doctrine), the
current Court has rejected all of these proposals, in all contexts. The
decision to reject conceptual severance in any circumstance is a
categorical rule that calls into doubt the Tahoe-Sierra majority's
ostensible concern with avoiding categorical rules. Or rather, it suggests
a qualification of the Court's resistance to the "temptation" of categorical
rules. Categorical rules that give the Court greater freedom of decision
in regulatory takings cases are apparently not the type of rule that gives
the Court concern.
Admittedly, the categorical rule against severance has been applied
haphazardly. There are some circumstances in which courts place limits
on how much property is included in the "parcel as a whole," and it is
something of a fiction to claim that these cases do not involve
severance.291 (These cases could, on the other hand, be said to show
depend on its economically productive potential as an independent unit.").
290. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 517 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no need for further analysis where the
government by regulation extinguishes the whole bundle of rights in an identifiable
segment of property, for the effect of this action on the holder of the property is
indistinguishable from the effect of a physical taking."). The similarity of this proposed
rule to the reasoning in Lucas is notable. Justice Scalia has also proposed, cryptically, a
solution to the problem in a Lucas footnote. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) ("The answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owner's
reasonable expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether
and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution
in (or elimination of) value.").
291. For example, in Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.
1991), the Federal Circuit addressed an alleged regulatory taking of coal rights, but the
property owner also had agricultural surface rights. Id. at 1170-74. The property owner,
with no intention of farming, had bought the surface land in order to facilitate the mining
of coal. The Federal Circuit determined that "coal rights ... is what, and only what, this
suit is about," and noted that, "[w]hen Congress prohibited that mining of that coal, .. . it
took, all the property involved in this case." Id. But saying that the suit was about coal
rights, even if true, fails to distinguish clearly decisions like Keystone Bituminous, in
which the plaintiffs no doubt also thought their case was about coal rights. Although
Whitney Benefits may be an outlying case, the question of what property is at issue will
often be susceptible to a severance characterization. For other examples, see Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994), FloridaRock Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and Palm Beach Isles Associates v.
United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000), aff'd on reh 'g, 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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courts' reluctance to practice "conceptual agglomeration," the lumping
together of properly separate parcels of property owned by the same
individual.292 ) The Federal Circuit in particular has engaged in severance
prior to applying the Penn Centraltest, based on a variety of factors.293
The Supreme Court has noted the difficulty in some cases of
properly determining the relevant parcel, and even the Supreme Court's
determinations of the relevant parcel offer examples that are readily
described as severance.294 This result suggests an unstated difficulty
with strictly applying the "parcel as a whole" rule. But, putting aside the
appropriateness of applying conceptual severance in exceptional cases,
the typical case has disallowed severance. The rule appears to apply
when the Supreme Court wishes to deny compensation, and not to apply
when the Court wishes to compensate partial takings.295
As recently as the Palazzolo decision, five Justices on the Court felt
296
unease with this situation.
Thus, the apparent embrace of the "parcel
as a whole" doctrine without further comment is a significant
development, even though on stare decisis grounds it is uneventful.297
Tahoe-Sierra, fitting so neatly into a Lucas analysis, is a very strong case
for conceptual severance based on practical equivalence. 298 The ready
denial of conceptual severance suggests that it is unlikely that another
takings case would convince the Court to reconsider its "parcel as a
292. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
293. For different perspectives on the Federal Circuit's treatment of the denominator
problem, see Lisker, supra note 274; Huffman, supra note 23; Courtney C. Tedrowe,
Note, Conceptual Severance and Takings in the Federal Circuit, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
586 (2000).
294. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) ("Had California
simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the
public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach, rather than
conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no
doubt there would have been a taking."); see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994) (stating same principle); cf.Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998)
(severing interest from principal for purposes of takings analysis).
295. See cases cited supra note 47.
296. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
297. The anti-severance rule was prominent in Penn Central. Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
298. It is worth noting that not all severance implicates Lucas, ifLucas is understood
in terms of physical property. For example, a regulation that destroys a single
economically beneficial use of land need not render the physical property useless. Many
economically beneficial uses might remain. In such a case, physical severance of the
property would not trigger Lucas's per se rule, as the impact of the regulation would not
be equivalent to a permanent physical invasion. This distinction might reassure those
Justices concerned with the costs of the Lucas per se rule. Such a regulation would,
however, render a portion of the property valueless-the right to the particular use at
issue would have no economic benefit. Paradoxically, the Court's emphasis on property
in terms of value broadens the potential ambit of Lucas, requiring a very broad nonseverance rule in order to limit the cases where compensation would be due.
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whole" rule, at least based on the practical
equivalence between a
299
regulation and a partial physical taking.
V.

Conclusion

In practical terms, the Lucas decision did not quite reach its tenth
birthday, although technically it is still intact. The bright-line reasoning
in Lucas is clearly out of favor. A review of Tahoe-Sierra shows a
rejection of the underlying theory behind Lucas-that is, the practical
equivalence doctrine, a rewriting of the Lucas test into a destruction of
all value test, a newly invigorated "parcel as a whole" doctrine, and a
probable reworking of the "implied limitation" doctrine into an
expectations-based theory. Each clarifying rule in Lucas yields in favor
of a Penn Centralrubric.
It remains to be seen what Tahoe-Sierra will mean in practice,
although it surely increases the likelihood that Penn Central will be the
basis for decision in any particular regulatory taking case. Also, the
nature of "background principles of state law" has not yet been redefined
in the Lucas context. And a practical equivalence theory could prevail
on different facts, as Tahoe-Sierra can be distinguished as a case that
was closely linked to the desire that zoning delays remain noncompensable.30 °
But the likelihood is that Tahoe-Sierra will enable courts to do what
Justice O'Connor has asked them to do-avoid the temptation of
categorical rules in either direction. 30 This is hardly contrary to the
desires of many lower courts. Holdings under Lucas will almost surely
become even more rare, while the inconsistencies that inevitably
proliferate under Penn Central will continue to generate criticism for the

299. The problem is unlikely to go away, however. Palazzolo highlights the practical
difficulties of the categorical rule against severance. Property is physically severable,

even in cases where the Court steadfastly avoids treating regulations as equivalent to
physical takings. Thus, as Justice Breyer noted in his Palazzolo dissent, it is entirely
possible under the Palazzolo rule that a piece of property subject to a potential Penn
Central regulatory taking analysis could be sold so that the new purchaser would own
property subject to a Lucas regulatory takings analysis. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 654-55

(Breyer, J., dissenting). Although Justice Breyer would reject such a result (and possibly
Justice O'Connor would as well), the very possibility indicates the incoherence of the

non-severance rule insofar as regulatory takings are analogized to physical takings.
300.

The Tahoe-Sierra opinion also left open the possibility of compensation for

temporary regulatory takings on slightly different facts. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
301. Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued for the opposite position. RoseAckerman, supra note 1, at 1711 ("While the Court should try for a principled resolution,

this is one legal area in which almost any consistent, publicly articulated approach is
better than none. Clear statement, even if not backed by clear thinking, will do much to
preserve the investment-backed expectations the Court talks so much about.").
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next couple of decades.
The anti-severance holding in Tahoe-Sierra could have a broad
impact in other contexts. In Lucas, Justice Scalia noted:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of
a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would

analyze the situation as one in which the owner had been deprived of
all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or
as one in which the 3owner
has suffered a mere diminution in value of
02

the tract as a whole.

By refusing to consider the divisibility of the property in Tahoe-Sierra,
the Court implies an answer to this question-the Court would likely
find a mere diminution.
Depending on judicial predilections, there may nevertheless be facts
to which a lower court would apply the Lucas per se rule. But it is
doubtful that the practical equivalence logic of that decision will be
extended to any additional context if the current majority holds. It is
striking at this late date that the Court feels the concepts underlying its
"fairness and justice" inquiry are not "fully determinate," and that a
majority of the Court does not wish to face the implications of a clear
regulatory takings doctrine, "in either direction." Penn Central presents
an ad hoc doctrine that the Court cannot adequately explain in
substantive terms-but rather in terms of the results the Court wishes to
avoid. That is the actual significance of Penn Central as interpreted by
Tahoe-Sierra. For the Court finds it very easy to resist the temptation of
categorical rules-the true judicial temptation is the freedom to decide
takings issues on a case-by-case basis.30 3
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Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S; 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
Justice Scalia has identified the likely motivation behind the Court's balancing

test:
[W]hen, in writing for the majority of the Court, I adopt a general rule, and say,
"This is the basis of our decision," I not only constrain lower courts, I constrain
myself as well. If the next case should have such different facts that my
political or policy preferences regarding the outcome are quite the opposite, I
will be unable to indulge those preferences; I have committed myself to the
governing principle. In the real world of appellate judging, it displays more
judicial restraint to adopt such a course than to announce that, "on balance," we
think the law was violated here-leaving ourselves free to say in the next case
that, "on balance," it was not.... Only by announcing rules do we hedge
ourselves in.
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179-80
(1989).

